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Abstract 
_______________________________ 
 
 In recent years, the rise in the formation of regional organizations such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mercado Común Del Sur 
(Mercosur) has drawn an increasing amount of attention from political scientists and 
economists. However, countries preparing for entry into regional organizations have the 
challenging task of promoting both economic and social integration. When preparing for 
accession into regional organizations, Mexico and Argentina implemented multiple 
changes in their economic and political practices. As a result of these changes, citizens 
who perceived themselves to be excluded from the benefits of regional integration 
formed social movements such as the Zapatista Army for National Liberation and El 
Movimiento de las Mujeres en Lucha to voice their opposition. This thesis explores the 
policy changes made as Mexico and Argentina prepared for accession into regional 
organizations, the social movements formed in opposition to these changes, and the 
responses formulated by Mexico’s and Argentina’s leaders in reaction to these 
movements. I conclude that countries preparing for entry into regional organizations must 
implement policies which address the political concerns of these groups, rather than 
simply their economic concerns. Failure to do so will lead to deep social divisions which 
will hinder the formation and development of regional organizations.  
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Introduction 
_______________________________ 
 
In my thesis, I conducted a study of the social movements formed in response to 
the economic and political reforms instituted by countries preparing for entry in regional 
organizations. In recent years, the rise in regionalism has been noted by scholars; 
however, the economic and political reforms associated with entry into regional 
agreements may have negative effects on certain economic and social groups within 
member countries. While political, economic, and business leaders aim to formulate 
economic reforms which will benefit their constituents, in practice the implementation of 
these policies has various effects of different sectors of society.  
I focused my studies on the social movements formed in Mexico and Argentina in 
reaction to the introduction of regional trade agreements in their countries, specifically, 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Mercado Común del Sur 
(Mercosur). Mexico and Argentina have undergone neo-liberal economic reforms which 
their leaders implemented in an effort to stabilize their economies and prepare their 
countries for entrance into regional trade agreements and competition in the world 
market. The reforms introduced in both countries have many similarities, thereby making 
them ideal candidates for comparison. By examining these two case studies, I was able to 
explore the economic and political reforms introduced, why these groups perceived 
themselves to be excluded from the benefits of membership in a regional organization, 
the actions these groups took in response to this perceived loss, and how governments 
can effectively participate in forms of economic integration which do not result in social 
disintegration.   
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 While writing my thesis, I utilized a variety of sources. A literary review of books 
and journal articles provided me with a background on the rise of regionalism, the effects 
of regional agreements on vulnerable constituents within member countries, and the 
responses formulated by these constituents. In recent years, the number of regional 
organizations formed has grown dramatically. Researching the history of regional 
organizations and the factors influencing their formation and growth enabled me to gain a 
better understanding of why states participate in such agreements and why certain groups 
perceive that they are negatively affected by their formation.  
 For my study of the social reaction formed in Mexico, I focused on the Zapatista 
Movement formed in Chiapas. The Zapatista Movement has attracted substantial 
attention from the international community, and the media attention devoted to the 
movement both within and outside of Mexico has produced a variety of publications 
which supported my research. News and journal articles, as well as the many books 
which have been written about the movement, allowed me to gain a thorough 
understanding of the Zapatistas response to the economic reforms introduced by 
Mexico’s participation in NAFTA. While the history of the Zapatista Movement is 
extensive, I chose to study the movement from its origins in the 1980’s through 1994, the 
year when the Zapatista Movement first emerged in public. 
For my study of the social reaction generated in Argentina, I utilized a research 
project which I conducted on El Movimiento de las Mujeres en Lucha (MML), a social 
movement formed by the wives of Argentina’s small farmers. The MML was formed in 
response to their community’s perceived economic losses as a result of Argentina’s 
neoliberal economic reforms and participation in Mercosur. During a month-long period, 
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I was able to travel throughout the Argentine countryside and conducted interviews with 
the movement’s leaders, participants, and scholars who have studied the movement from 
its beginnings. Although the movement has attracted some attention within South 
America and Europe, the MML has not attracted as extensive an amount of international 
attention as the Zapatistas. Consequently, I relied primarily on the literature review and 
interviews I conducted during my time in Argentina for my understanding of the MML. 
While my research resources for the MML are not as extensive as those available for the 
Zapatistas, my past research allowed me to study the movement from its origins in 1994 
through 2007. Originally conducted and written in Spanish, this project includes a variety 
of first-hand interviews with the movement’s leaders and Argentine scholars who have 
followed the movement’s development from its inception.  
 In recent decades, regionalism has grown markedly. By studying the effects of 
regionalism on groups which are socially and economically vulnerable to the changes 
brought about by regionalism, I was able to examine the responses formulated by such 
groups. Through careful study of their responses to regional agreements, and what 
effects, if any, they have brought about in their government’s participation in regional 
trade agreements, I gained a fuller understanding of how governments entering in to 
regional organizations can manage the effects of such agreements on vulnerable socio-
economic groups through a variety of responses.   
 The study of the social reactions to regional agreements is particularly timely as 
many regional organizations, such as Mercosur, are beginning to extend offers of  
membership and associate membership to new countries. By studying the social 
movements by those groups who perceive themselves to be marginalized by free trade 
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and regional economic agreements, we can gain a better understanding of how these 
sectors can be better incorporated into regional agreements. Although political and 
economic elites enter into regional and free trade agreements with the belief that their 
constituents will experience a net benefit, there may be certain economic and social 
sectors which perceive themselves to be excluded from these benefits. Understanding 
who these groups are and how they perceive the effects of regional organizations will 
allow political and economic leaders to formulate provisions designed to help these 
groups transition into the new political and economic reality created by their country’s 
participation in a regional organization. Because certain groups may perceive that they 
are negatively affected by their country’s participation in a regional agreement, political 
leaders hoping to maintain and deepen their country’s participation in regional trade 
agreements must work to promote both economic and social integration in order for 
regionalism to continue to thrive.  
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Chapter One 
_______________________________ 
 
In recent years, the rise in regional free trade agreements has been noted by both 
economists and politicians. In order to gain a complete understanding of the reactions to 
regional agreements, it is important to first examine the political climate in which 
international organizations emerged. An understanding of the historical context 
surrounding the rise in regional agreements is important in understanding the political 
and economic climate in which these agreements are formed, as well as the social 
reactions formed by sectors who perceived themselves to be excluded from the benefits 
of such agreements.  
 International organizations began to emerge in significant numbers after World 
Wars I and II as nations sought to cooperate with each other to reduce the possibility of 
engaging in another costly war. The League of Nations, formed after the conclusion of 
World War I, is an important example of the movement towards the use of international 
cooperation to minimize international tensions. In his discussion on the sequencing of 
regional economic integration, economist Jeffrey Bergstrand notes that the proliferation 
of economic integration agreements began at the end of World War II and was sparked 
by the October 30, 1947 signing of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) 
and the 1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome, which led to the creation of the European 
Community. These two signings, within a decade of each other, represented major 
political and economic shifts towards cooperation. 
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 As illustrated by the above graph, since the end of World War II, there have been 
two distinct periods in the growth of regionalism. Economist Jagdish Bhagwati labels the 
two periods as “first regionalism” and “second regionalism.”1 Bhagwati states that the 
first regionalism began in the late 1950’s and lasted until the early 1970's; however, this 
period ended in failure as the regional organizations formed were too weak and 
ultimately collapsed. However, the data collected by the World Trade Organization and 
reflected in the above graph shows that the number of preferential trade agreements 
formed during the 1970’s remained quite strong; therefore, it may be more appropriate to 
designate the early 1980’s as the end to the period of first regionalism.  These first 
agreements were an “extension of the import-substitution-industrialization strategy from 
the national to the regional level,” and agreements formed during this period were 
                                                 
1 Jagdish Bhagwati, “Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview,” in New Dimensions in Regional 
Integration, ed. Jamie de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
28.  
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focused inward.2 During this first period, developing countries received their 
independence from colonial powers and began to form regional associations. Developing 
countries saw the formation of regional organizations as a vehicle for economic 
development as their participation would increase their access to large-scale markets and 
ultimately lessen their dependence on former colonial powers. However, the “outbreak” 
of regional organizations such as the Latin American Free-Trade Area, the Central 
American Common Market, the Andean Pact, and the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market failed in developing countries because they attempted to allocate 
industries through bureaucratic negotiation, rather than relying on the market.3 In 
addition, regionalism failed to take root because the United States, already an important 
world power, was considered to be indifferent towards such agreements. Although World 
Wars I and II played an important role in encouraging the development of international 
organizations, the growth of such organizations would be limited until the end of another 
important war: namely, the Cold War.  
Although the Cold War began in 1947, the re-invigoration of the Cold War during 
the administration of Ronald Reagan from 1981 through 1988 led to a significant decline 
in the formation of new regional trade agreements. During the Cold War, the formation of 
regional organizations slowed to a crawl as countries were divided into the Communist 
and anti-Communist blocs. In this bipolar world the possibilities for cooperation and the 
formation of multilateral organizations were limited by the division between the two 
political blocs. It was not until the Cold War’s end in 1989 that this bipolar world order 
                                                 
2 Jamie de Melo, Arvind Panagariya, and Dani Rodrik, “The New Regionalism: A Country Perspective,” in 
New Dimensions in Regional Integration, ed. Jamie de Melo and Arvind Panagariya (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 159.     
3 Bhagwati, 28. 
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ended and the possibility of multilateral political cooperation re-emerged. With the 
removal of political obstacles which had hindered the growth of international 
cooperation, international organizations such as the United Nations were able to resume 
their efforts of encouraging political cooperation. Due to the significant change in the 
world’s political and economic order, opportunities for political integration and 
cooperation were ripe around the globe, particularly in Latin America.  
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the world was introduced to the period of 
second regionalism which is characterized by traits which are quite distinct from that of 
the first regionalism. While the bipolar political environment created during the Cold 
War hindered the formation of multilateral regional organizations, its conclusion led a 
dramatic increase in the number of multilateral preferential trade agreements. After the 
conclusion of the Cold War, more regional agreements were signed during the late 1980’s 
when compared to the number of agreements signed during the 1960’s.4 Although the 
regional organizations which emerged during this period were remarkable in number, 
they are noted for many other distinguishing characteristics.  
One major influence on the growth of second regionalism was the expansion of 
the European Union towards Eastern Europe. This expansion awakened the United States 
from its period of indifference towards regionalism, and for the first time, it began to look 
past the political benefits accrued from such organizations. The United States began to 
realize the economic benefits accompanying participation in regional organizations. The 
recognition of the possible economic benefits, as well as the increasing desire within the 
Americas and Asia to form a response to the expansion of the European Union helped 
resurrect the growth of regionalism. Scholars such as Bhagwati believe that the support of 
                                                 
4 de Melo, 159. 
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the United States is a key component in regionalism’s resurrection, and that the support 
of the United States for regional organizations is a signal that this second era of 
regionalism will enjoy greater longevity and success when compared to the first period.  
Unlike previous periods of regional growth, in the early 1990's countries formed 
preferential trade agreements to "prompt and consolidate economic and political 
reforms."5 Mexico underwent extensive economic reforms in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, and it began to discuss the feasibility of establishing a preferential trade 
agreement with the United States and Canada. In South America, Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay were all undergoing profound economic and political changes 
which sparked dialogue on the creation of a regional trade agreement. While the first 
period of regionalism was characterized by agreements formed among developing 
countries in Latin America and Africa, the second period was characterized by the 
formation of regional agreements between developed and underdeveloped countries, 
particularly in Latin America.6 During the period of second regionalism, preferential 
trade agreements were no longer formed in an effort to shelter their members from the 
world economy. Rather, countries began to view regional trade agreements as a way to 
simultaneously consolidate economic reforms and boost their participation and presence 
in foreign political and economic arenas.  
In addition to the desire to consolidate economic reforms, there are also several 
other characteristics typical of the new wave of regionalism. Mansfield states that 
democracies are more likely to form economic integration agreements than non-
                                                 
5 Edward D. Mansfield and Helen V. Milner, “The New Wave of Regionalism,” in The Politics of Global 
Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, ed. Paul F. Diehl (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2005), 341.  
6 de Melo, 159.  
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democratic states; therefore, democracy may be a precondition for the formation of 
successful regional agreement. The presence of a democratic government is particularly 
important in Latin America as many governments used democracy as a prerequisite for 
entry. Many leaders also saw the participation of their newly democratic country in a 
regional organization as a way to consolidate and protect this new form of government.  
While a democratic government is an important characteristic of participation in a 
regional trade agreement, Bergstrand denotes three characteristics of economic 
integration agreements. These agreements are typically regional in nature and occur  most 
often among countries located on the same continent. Regional trade agreements are 
formed among countries that are economically large and similar in some respects, such as 
among countries with similar economic and political structures. Also, many regional 
organizations begin as free trade agreements rather than as preferential trade agreements, 
customs unions, or economic unions.  
Presently, more than 300 economic integration agreements have been signed. 
Countries agree to integrate economically believing that cooperate will ultimately benefit 
their country. One benefit is the access to a larger market. For those countries that belong 
to preferential trade agreements, the cost of joining successive agreements is lower than 
the costs associated with signing the first agreement, as the first agreement established 
the basic foundation on which later integration efforts could expand. Primary agreements 
on trade are easy to establish because trade is divisible, and countries can focus on 
specific industries and tariffs. Although trade agreements may begin by focusing on a 
specific sector or commodity, participation in these trade agreements establishes the 
linkages needed to increase cooperation in future endeavors. If the trade agreements are 
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believed to be efficient and beneficial, the countries will successfully cooperate in future 
endeavors. Negative externalities may also increase cooperation, as issues such as border 
congestion or air pollution will increase the demand for cooperation and the 
establishment of public goods to resolve these externalities. Once countries have 
established agreements on relatively easy topics such as trade, later agreements can 
extend to areas in which cooperation is more difficult, such as the areas of transport, 
border security, investment, mutual assistance, and the development of infrastructure.  
There have been several recent developments in trade and economic agreements 
which have become characteristics of cooperation agreements. Today, even poor and 
underdeveloped states are participating in regional economic agreements. Cooperation is 
not restricted to wealthy states: rather, many poor states now see integration as the 
vehicle driving development within their countries. Those countries which cooperate with 
major global partners are more likely to increase the share of agreements that they have 
with regional partners. Therefore, cooperation within and outside of the region indicate 
that states will further deepen their involvement in the regional integration process. 
Agreements with powers outside of a given economic region have become increasingly 
important, and there has been a rise in transcontinental bilateral trade agreements. Trade’s 
amenability has been an important force in driving the formation of economic integration 
agreements because it allows countries to focus on a specific commodity or industry, 
thereby simplifying the integration process. 
The second rise in regionalism has produced three blocs within the world trading 
system. The European Community, East Asia, and the Americas are the three main blocs 
within this system, and each has begun to construct their own regional products. Within 
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my thesis, I will focus on the social reaction to the rise of regional trade organizations 
within the Americas. By comparing and contrasting the cases of Mexico and Argentina, I 
hope to understand the changes in national norms and values which were made to prepare 
these two countries for membership, why the two groups perceive themselves to be 
excluded from this second wave of regionalism, the actions they are taking to express 
their discontent, and the policies formulated by political and economic leaders in these 
two countries in an effort to promote economic and social integration.  
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Chapter Two 
_______________________________ 
 
 Many political, social, and economic leaders within Mexico and Argentina may 
have agreed to participate in NAFTA and Mercosur believing that their countries would 
benefit economically, politically, and socially. Even though the economic reforms 
introduced to prepare their countries for membership in regional trade agreements, such 
as privatization and a decrease in subsidies in certain industries, would be difficult and 
perhaps even politically unpopular, they were implemented nonetheless. Ultimately, the 
political leaders within Mexico and Argentina believed that their country’s completion of 
neo-liberal reforms was essential in order for their country to be economically 
competitive in the world market.  
 However, a country’s economic and political participation in regional agreements 
may also upset its domestic social order. Domestic norms and social institutions may 
change, leading to discontent among groups which were dependent upon or which 
benefited from these arrangements.7 The values and norms once embodied by 
government policies which afforded preferential treatment for certain sectors may change 
as countries prepare to enter regional agreements, and these sectors may lose their special 
treatment and benefits. In this atmosphere, “trade becomes contentious when it unleashes 
forces that undermine the norms implicit in domestic practices.”8 In the case of NAFTA 
and Mercosur, for example, changes in economic practices and land policies caused 
discontent among certain sectors and led to a rise in social protest. For groups which 
                                                 
7 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalizaiton Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 
1997), 5.   
8 Ibid., 5. 
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perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by such changes, the question of procedural 
fairness in economic practices becomes central. One response generated by sectors which 
perceive themselves to be disadvantaged by changes in the domestic economic order, 
such as small farmers, may be to call for “fair trade.”9 Although trade policy is frequently 
linked to redistributive consequences, either “among sectors, income groups, and 
individuals,” it is important that governments examine the fairness of these practices.10 
Due to the unpopular redistributive effects of changing economic practices, it may be 
difficult for government leaders to obtain broad support for the regional project.  
 The change in national norms may lead to a rise in social discontent, particularly 
among groups which perceive themselves to be excluded from the debate surrounding 
these changes. In many countries such as Mexico and Argentina, the decision to 
participate in regional organizations is typically made among policy elites. Domestic 
politics play an important role in determining the type of regional organization formed, 
and leaders have the difficult task of “promoting [their] country’s aggregate economic 
welfare and accommodating interest groups whose support is needed to retain office.”11 
While regionalism in the past was characterized by a country’s desire to improve its 
political-military capacity, since the end of the Cold War, the defining characteristic of 
the new wave of regionalism has been the desire of policymakers to circumvent domestic 
barriers to continued liberalization.12 By binding their countries to these agreements, 
political leaders ensure that the process of liberalization will continue. 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 5.  
10 Ibid., 6.  
11 Mansfield, 343.    
12 Ibid., 345. 
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  However, the decision-makers in this new form of regionalism are frequently 
political and economic elites, as the majority of regional agreements are formed through a 
treaty process. Thus, representatives of national governments, who are in turn influenced 
by powerful national organizations and citizens, are charged with representing their 
nation’s interests in the treaty process. The country’s political and economic elite, 
particularly in developing countries, have begun to promote participation in regional 
trade agreements as a means through which export- and foreign investment policies will 
replace import substitution as the path of economic growth and stability.13 Therefore, 
public policy leaders who stand to benefit from such policies may promote them, stating 
that such practices will promote aggregate economic well-being. The exclusion of the 
majority of a nation’s citizens from the decision to prepare the country for entry into a 
regional agreement, as well as their perception that their sector has experienced the 
negative effects which stem from their country’s participation in a regional organization 
may result in the formation of a social movement protesting these changes. 
 Another issue involved in the formation of regional agreements is the notion of 
social insurance. By entering into a regional organization, a country may severely restrict 
its ability to provide social insurance to its citizens. The reduction of social insurance is 
particularly dangerous because the government’s guarantee of insurance has aided its 
liberalization process by maintaining the “social cohesion” and domestic political support 
necessary for such reforms to occur.14 Through a variety of fiscal tools, governments 
have been able and have been expected to insulate certain sectors from market risks. By 
participating in a regional organization, a country’s ability to use its fiscal tools to protect 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 342. 
14 Rodrik, 6. 
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and insulate certain sectors may be restricted or prohibited. The government’s inability to 
insulate certain groups may make its participation in regional trade agreements unpopular 
among certain sectors. As integration increases, certain sectors, such as small farmers, 
may be increasingly dependent upon their government’s social insurance; however, 
economic integration often entails “receding governments” and “diminished social 
obligations,” leaving these sectors vulnerable and discontent.15  
 The changes in a government’s ability to protect domestic norms and maintain 
social insurance pose serious threats to the future of international economic integration. 
First, failure to address these questions may lead to an overwhelming lack of support for 
participation in such agreements. In such an environment, countries may reverse earlier 
decisions to participate in regional economic agreements and revert to protectionist 
economic measures. Another real possibility is that participation in international 
economic agreements may “solidify a new set of class divisions,” and that society will be 
divided between those who benefit and those who lose from participation in regional 
agreements.16 Social disintegration is a very real threat, and a failure to address this 
possibility may harm the process of regional integration.  
 Recent changes in the nature of globalization and economic integration must also 
be examined if governments hope to address the conditions which threaten to create 
socially divisive situations. Unlike the 19th century, international labor mobility in 
today’s market is not faced with as many restrictions. Presently, governments must 
address the difference between mobile and immobile “natural” capital and policies which 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 6.  
16 Ibid., 6.  
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will work to the benefit of both.17 Groups with higher levels of mobility and skills are 
able to flourish within the global market, whereas groups with limited levels of mobility 
and a lower skill set are unable to effectively compete within the world market. While 
globalization in the 1890’s involved trading “noncompeting products,” today’s system 
involves direct competition between goods which are identical or similar in nature.18 
Also, governments today are also expected to provide their citizens with a certain level of 
social-welfare. Although governments were not expected to perform in this capacity 
during the 19th century, in many developed and in some developing countries 
governments are expected to provide a social safety net which cares for citizens’ needs in 
areas such as employment opportunities or medical care.19 The change in the process of 
globalization and the roles that individual governments are expected to play complicates 
a country’s participation in international economic agreements, and countries must 
carefully evaluate their participation in light of these changing expectations and 
responsibilities. 
 When examining potential sources of conflict within a country due to its 
participation in a regional agreement and trade’s effect on domestic norms and 
institutions, it is important to consider the mechanisms which countries may use to 
prevent and resolve such conflict. Countries should question the legitimacy and fairness 
of domestic norms and the economic policies which stem from their participation in 
regional trade agreements. By doing so, countries can determine whether the practices 
involved in integration are allied with their domestic values and institutions, and from 
there they can work to formulate an effective response. One potentially dangerous 
                                                 
17 Ibid., 8.  
18 Ibid., 8.  
19 Ibid., 9.  
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response to social protest is the extensive use of protectionism, which hinders the project 
of economic integration. According to scholar Dani Rodrik, fair trade and trade 
restrictions can only be considered if they will protect the values and institutions of the 
home country, and can never be used to impose one country’s norms on another.20 If 
certain social groups protest or express their discontent to the government, the 
government may institute trade restrictions to protect its country’s values and institutions. 
Thus, if a country such as Mexico determines that trade and economic integration violate 
its norms and values it may erect trade restrictions insofar as such barriers protect their 
home values. In this way, governments can erect certain restrictions which will help them 
satisfy the demands of social groups which perceive themselves to be excluded from the 
benefits of regional economic integration. 
Economic integration is oftentimes easier among countries with shared norms and 
domestic institutions. However, although shared characteristics provide the foundation 
for countries to deepen their integration, it also makes it difficult for them to implement 
social policies which are different from those of their trade partners. As integration 
depends, governments face the difficult task of simultaneously participating in economic 
integration and managing their social system’s needs and demands. Rodrik’s discussion 
of this balance is particularly interesting as he acknowledges that countries cannot simply 
accept trade liberalization without considering the specific policies and needs of their 
individual country. While economists see integration as an opportunity to increase 
everyone’s share of the economic pie, he acknowledges that there are both economic and 
social costs entailed in liberalization.21 Even though trade restrictions may not be the best 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 38. 
21 Ibid., 48. 
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solution, they are one channel that countries can utilize to protect their institutions and 
values. However, Rodrik cautions that although countries have a legitimate need to be 
concerned about their domestic norms and institutions, they must find a way to maintain 
their national values without using blanket protectionism.  
 Although international trade has grown noticeably since the conclusion of World 
War II, thus far major social dislocations or significant opposition has not arisen in those 
countries with advanced industrial capabilities. However, as regional trade agreements 
begin to incorporate developing countries, it remains to be seen whether a significant 
movement will arise in response to economic integration. In this new form of 
globalization, developing countries are “perhaps even more exposed than the advanced 
industrial countries,” and citizens in developing countries are sharply divided into groups 
which benefit from globalization and those who are excluded from such benefits.22 Will 
an “embedded liberalism,” in which the governments provide the social funding needed 
to cushion certain sectors from the effects of free trade, arise? Economic integration is a 
dangerous project which “highlights and exacerbates tensions among groups.”23 Rodrik 
cautions that “If [tensions are] not handled well, then, the social pressures unleashed by 
global economic integration will likely result in bad economics and bad governance.”24 
Economic integration must work to politically and socially engage these diverse groups, 
as these are the tools which allow a variety of distinct groups to work together as a 
community. Failure to do so may create a social reaction which, if it has significant 
levels of support, may generate significant change in government policies. 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 70. 
23 Ibid., 70. 
24 Ibid., 69. 
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In an era where national borders have become extremely porous, nations are faced 
with the difficult task of balancing economic liberalization while maintaining domestic 
stability. However, our policy choices, according to Keynes, should not be limited to a 
choice between protectionism or Marxist socialism. Imaginative responses, particularly 
from international economists, need to be formulated if we hope to create a set of policies 
which ensure that regional economic practices establish a social system which is 
inclusive, rather than divisive. While economists can refute the false arguments 
oftentimes used to dismiss economic integration and globalization as harmful, they can 
also formulate creative responses.  
 To engender support, it is important that politicians do not simply state that 
domestic economic reforms are necessary to maintain their country’s competitiveness. 
Using competitiveness as the basis for reform erodes domestic support for participation in 
international trade. Rather, politicians should explain why the reforms are taking place, 
and how these reforms will be good and beneficial for the country and its citizenry. 
Explaining reforms in this manner will help a country’s citizens gain a better 
understanding of the important issues and will facilitate public discussion and debate on 
the topic. When discussing trade restrictions, which may be used on the basis of fairness, 
countries must ensure that the norms which they are professing to uphold are widely held 
and have broad support at home. While a country may legitimately use the fairness 
argument to employ trade restrictions which uphold its own norms, it would be 
considered coercive for these countries to use trade restrictions to pressure other countries 
to change their domestic norms.   
 23
 While deep integration and convergence among willing countries is possible, 
there must also be provisions for selective disengagement. Well-specified “breathing 
room” will provide countries with the space they need to satisfy their domestic 
requirements, especially if their domestic norms and institutions are not in full alignment 
with liberal trade practices.25 Nations may employ trade restrictions not because they are 
concerned about competition, but because they are concerned about the conflict between 
liberalized trade practices and domestic social norms and values. However, if a country is 
to employ trade restrictions, the member countries of an organization must agree upon a 
detailed process which nations must complete before such barriers can be erected. While 
import-competing groups are typically the most vocal groups concerning arguments 
about trade restrictions, it is important that all economic groups with a country are heard. 
A debate which is truly public will help determine whether protectionist measures are in 
the country’s best interest, and will provide legitimacy to their decision if they do indeed 
decide to enact trade barriers to protect their domestic norms.  
In an era when countries are working to economically integrate their goods, 
services, and capital in regional agreements, it is important that countries take into 
account the changes in their traditional practices and values. As economic integration 
increases, especially among developing countries, it is important that we remember that 
trade liberalization and globalization “[are] not occurring in a vacuum.”26 Although 
changes in the fields of communication and transportation mean that a country’s 
economy is exposed to the international market in new and unexpected ways, thereby 
making it difficult for policymakers to protect certain sectors, it is important to evaluate 
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the ways in which a country may help these sectors participate in regional economic 
agreements without creating a socially divisive environment. While there is limited data 
available depicting “which domestic groups support regional trade agreements,” as well 
as “whose interests these agreements serve,” by looking at the social reactions to the 
formation of regional agreements we can examine who perceives themselves to be 
excluded from the benefits of regional integration.27 Economic integration hopes to 
increase market access and spread economic growth throughout a given country or 
region; however, governments must plan for those groups which may be negatively 
impacted by the process of regional integration, specifically in regards to the changes in 
the government’s ability to insulate and provide for certain sectors. Although political 
and economic leaders believe that regional integration is ultimately an important and 
beneficial process, they must also take care to ensure that economic integration does not 
lead to social disintegration. Failure to account for the changes in the nature of 
globalization and the role of the state may create a system of globalization which is 
socially divisive and which leads to the emergence of social protests among certain 
groups. The challenge for countries involved in regional organizations is to increase 
integration without destroying the foundation of social cooperation; however, until we 
gain a fuller understanding of the policy changes made in countries preparing for regional 
integration, as well as those who perceive themselves to be excluded from the benefits of 
integration, it will be difficult to implement policies which promote both economic and 
social integration.  
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Chapter 3 
_______________________________ 
 
 To best understand the conditions which led to the rise of social movements in 
reaction to the formation of regional trade agreements, it is important to examine the 
changes in institutions and values within Mexico and Argentina. As these two countries 
prepared to become members of NAFTA and MERCOSUR, both underwent extensive 
changes. Beginning in the late 1980s, when dialogue on the formation of regional 
organizations began for these two countries, they began to prepare for membership by 
implementing changes in their economic and political structure. Even though these 
economic and political changes were made to prepare their countries for participation in a 
regional organization, obtaining an understanding of the changes which occurred at the 
national level is critical. Although the social movements formed in Mexico and Argentina 
denounce the involvement of their countries in regional trade agreements, they are 
reacting to the changes in national institutions and values. Therefore, it is important to 
understand what the members of these social movements perceive as changes in national 
institutions, as their movements were formed to counteract the perceived negative effects 
of these policy changes. 
 During the 1980’s, the economic and political systems of Mexico and Argentina 
were focused inwards. After the conclusion of World War II, Latin American countries 
adopted the inward-oriented import-substitution industrialization policies, believing that 
closing their markets to the world economy would provide them with the opportunity to 
develop away from the influence of powerful developed countries. Therefore, beginning 
in the early 1950’s, Latin American countries supported government efforts aimed at 
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regulating the effects of the international economy and fostering the growth of domestic 
industries. These economic and political policies were the institutional norm for nearly 
thirty years; however, by the 1980’s Latin American countries were described as having 
“inefficient governments, overregulation, and a highly protected economy.”28 It was not 
until the mid- to late-1980’s that Latin American countries began to recognize the 
limitations of their economic and political isolation, and began to look for opportunities 
to enhance their economic and political participation in the international arena. As they 
began to reassess their position within the world political and economic order, a “natural 
outcome,” both Mexico and Argentina began to prepare their countries to successfully 
compete within their regions.29 Consequently, beginning in the late 1980’s and the early 
1990’s, these two countries began to introduce “far-reaching unilateral liberalization 
measures” and examine ways in which their countries could enter into the growing 
regional and world economy.  
 
Mexico 
 On January 1, 1994, NAFTA went into effect, and counted Mexico as one of its 
three member countries. However, the discussions and policies formulated to prepare 
Mexico to become a part of NAFTA began many years prior. Mexico began dialogue 
with the U.S. concerning the formation of a regional trade agreement in 1988; however, 
at this point in time, Mexico’s economic woes made participation in such an agreement 
difficult. Conversely, in March of 1990, Mexico’s president Carlos Salinas believed that 
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the formation of a regional trade agreement would be an important economic step 
forward for Mexico. Thus, Salinas opened negotiations between Mexico and the U.S., 
believing that regional integration would attract foreign investment and promote 
economic growth for his country.  
 Although Salinas presided over NAFTA’s implementation in Mexico, the changes 
made to prepare Mexico for entry into a regional agreement began far earlier. In 1982,  
the price of petroleum plummeted and international interest rates began to rise, prompting 
Mexico to look for alternatives to the inward-oriented, import substitution 
industrialization model. Under the presidency of Miguel de la Madrid, Mexico’s political 
leaders began to open up their country to the outside. By doing so, Madrid began 
government efforts aimed at developing a manufacturing export sector.30 
 With the discovery of oil, President Portillo began a fiscal expansion, rather than 
a contraction. During this period, government spending levels and the number of 
government-owned firms increased markedly as Portillo anticipated enormous oil profits. 
While the number of state-owned firms was below 300 between 1950 and 1970, by 1982 
there were 1,155, and by 1983 over eighteen percent of Mexico’s GDP came from state-
owned firms.31 The government owned the national oil company, PEMEX, the 
Aeromexico and Mexicana airlines, the national telephone company, and many other 
entities. Believing that Mexico’s economic boom would continue, Portillo increased 
spending levels dramatically. 
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 However, Portillo’s economic expansion came to an end, and the end of Mexico’s 
economic boom placed the country in a precarious position. Beginning in 1981, oil prices 
fell and U.S. real interest rates rose, overvaluing Mexico’s exchange rate and leading to 
capital flight. By 1982, Portillo devalued the peso by 260 percent, converted bank 
deposits which were in dollars into pesos, and put a moratorium on foreign debt 
payments in an attempt to stabilize the exchange rate.32 However, the heavy level of 
government intervention into the economy was seen as a negative sign by foreign 
investors, leading to an inflation rate of 100 percent and a decline of over eight percent in 
GDP for 1982 and 1983.33 Mexico’s dependency on the continuation of oil profits was 
interrupted, and it became apparent that liberalizing the country’s economic structure and 
limiting the accumulation of foreign debt were necessary steps if Mexico hoped to 
participate in the world market. 
 Near the end of 1982, President De la Madrid came into office and was tasked 
with the responsibility of reforming Mexico’s economic structures. Although De la 
Madrid’s practice of tight monetary and fiscal policy reduced the annual inflation rate by 
thirty-five points, GDP growth slowed as De la Madrid cut government spending 
programs and transferred six percent of the country’s GDP towards foreign debt 
payments.34 However, De la Madrid railed to eliminate the causes of the inflation, and by 
1986 the annual inflation rate had returned to the previous levels experienced under 
Portillo. The Mexican government did not have a fully open market, and the government 
limited foreign ownership and continued to control the banking sector. Despite these 
failings, between 1985 and 1987 an earthquake, further drops in oil prices, and a stock 
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market crash provided Mexico with another opportunity to address its economic 
infrastructure and prepare for its entrance into regional trade agreements.  
 At the end of 1987, De la Madrid signed what is commonly known as the Pacto, 
referring to the Pact for Economic Solidarity. Under President Salinas, an additional 
component of the Pacto, known as the Pact for Stability and Economic Growth, was 
signed with labor, farming, and business sectors. The Pacto is an example of the social 
programs and spending that Mexico implemented in an attempt to mitigate the transition 
from a closed to an open economic structure. The Pacto provided Mexico with the steps 
needed to initially tighten its fiscal and monetary policy while working to control wages 
and prices, and had the goal of eventually leading to deregulation and privatization.  
 The Pacto provided for the privatization of state enterprises, another important 
step in opening up Mexico’s economy to free-market forces. While Mexico had nearly 
1,155 state enterprises when the Pacto was implemented, by 1994 nearly 940 of these 
state-owned enterprises  were privatized.35 As a result, expenditures attributed to state-
owned enterprises fell dramatically, and by 1994 they amounted to only 9.6 percent of 
Mexico’s GDP.36 Mexico has also reformed and simplified its tax system in 1989, and 
tax revenue increased by roughly 30 percent during the early 1990’s.37 The fiscal deficit 
fell to less than one percent of GDP, a dramatic decline from its 1987 levels of 16 
percent, government spending fell by nearly twenty percentage points to 26.3 percent of 
GDP, and inflation fell to an annual rate of seven percent.38  
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 In addition to the reforms made to public finance and government spending, 
important changes regarding the liberalization of Mexico’s financial system were also 
made. In 1988, compulsory bank reserve requirements and mandatory credit to state-
owned enterprise were abolished, thereby creating financial resources available for 
privately owned companies. In addition to the liberalization of reserve requirements, 
between 1991 and 1992 Mexico privatized all state-owned banks, ended many of the 
controls on foreign capital, and authorized the entry of foreign banks and brokerage 
houses into Mexico’s market, extending over fifty licenses to a variety of banks and 
firms. 
 Another important step was the liberalization of trade. While Mexico began the 
process of trade liberalization in 1985, the process did not gain momentum until 1988. In 
1988, discussion began regarding the possibility of a regional trade agreement between 
Mexico and the United States, and it is this discussion which may have cemented 
Mexico’s commitment to trade liberalization. By 1992, the share of imports covered by 
import permits fell to two percent from previous levels of one-hundred percent in 1983.39  
In 1986 Mexico formally entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which 
was important preparation for its eventual accession to NAFTA.  
 In addition to liberalizing its trade practices, Mexico also experienced significant 
changes in its monetary and exchange rate policy. As part of the Pacto, Mexico 
established a fixed exchange rate in which the peso’s value was tied to that of the U.S. 
dollar. However, a fixed exchange rate limits the monetary tools available to a country 
when faced with a financial crisis; thus, in 1991, Mexico widened the band in which the 
exchange rate was allowed to float, thereby beginning the transition from a fixed to a 
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managed float exchange rate. While this band rose remarkably, Mexico experienced 
strong pressure from international investors and exchange markets to value the peso at its 
true market value, and in 1994 the peso was allowed to float freely. Therefore, Mexico’s 
abandonment of its fixed exchange rate policy allowed it to gain the confidence of 
international investors and increased the monetary tools available at its disposal, even 
though critics stated that it hurt Mexico’s ability to reduce its inflation rates. 
 While Mexico experienced significant changes in its economic policies under the 
leadership of President Salinas, important political changes were also made during this 
period. One of the major changes instituted by Salinas was the revision of Article 27 in 
Mexico’s Constitution implemented on February 27, 1992. The revision of the article 
changed Mexico’s land policy significantly, effectively ending Mexico’s policy of land 
distribution. The original article included in the Constitution of 1917 allowed Mexico’s 
citizens to petition Mexico’s Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which would redistribute land 
which was not being used to communal ejidos. The community would retain control over 
the ejidos as long as the land was being used for production or was lived on. However, 
the revision of Article 27 ended this long-held tradition of land distribution by allowing 
peasants to sell their ejidos holdings and by loosening restrictions on the purchase of land 
by foreigners and corporations. For Mexico’s small farmers and indigenous population, 
the revision of Article 27 was seen as a major change in the country’s norms and 
institutions. 
 The changes occurring in Mexico’s economy in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
signaled a major shift in the country’s “economic paradigm.”40 The economic and 
political decisions made during this era involved significant alterations in the country’s 
                                                 
40 Ibid., 11.  
 32
economic and political norms and institutions. These changes signal the possibility of a 
growth in political and social opposition, especially from groups who feel betrayed or 
excluded by the policy changes and the accompanying distribution of benefits. In 
previous decades, Mexico had established a political and economic order which focused 
on developing its domestic economy without the assistance or involvement of the 
powerful United States; however, Mexico’s economic and political liberalization 
culminated with its entry into NAFTA. The social movements formed in reaction to 
Mexico’s accession to NAFTA provide important clues regarding how these institutional 
changes were viewed, and it is important to understand these movements in order to 
comprehend why certain social groups perceive themselves to be excluded from the 
benefits of regional trade agreements, and how they react in such situations.  
 
Argentina 
 On March 26, 1991, Argentina signed the Tratado de Asuncion along with Brazil, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay. By signing this treaty, these four countries from the Southern 
Cone region agreed to the formation of a regional organization by the end of 1994, and 
established a schedule of tariffs reduction with the goal of eliminating them completely. 
Although Argentina made an important commitment to economic integration through its 
participation in the treaty, its program of economic reform and liberalization began long 
before in an effort to prepare the country for participation in a regional organization.  
 Beginning in 1988, Argentina began to open its economy to the outside world. 
Argentina’s movement towards openness and integration was fueled by the dialogue that 
it began with its neighbor, Brazil, regarding economic integration and cooperation. In 
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1986, the conversation between the two countries resulted in the November 30, 1985 
signing of the Acta de Buenos Aires and the November 29, 1988 signing of the Tratado 
de Integración. Scholars have described these two agreements as pressure points which 
increased the urgency and necessity of domestic economic reform if Argentina hoped to 
successfully participate in an economic agreement with its neighbors.41 These two 
agreements symbolized the commitment of both Argentina and Brazil to shift away from 
inward-oriented economic policies and towards policies of liberalization and economic 
integration. 
However, Argentina’s commitment to economic integration would lead it to make 
many important economic changes. As Argentina began to look towards the creation of a 
regional economic organization, it also began to implement changes at the national level. 
Neoliberal economic practices were implemented in an effort to prepare Argentina for 
entry into a regional organization, and these new policies were oftentimes remarkable 
changes from the national norms and values held by past regimes. The election of 
President Carlos Menem ushered in a new era in which neoliberal economic policies 
were introduced, to the chagrin of various social groups. For Argentina’s political and 
economic leaders, not unlike Mexico’s, liberalization and economic integration were 
viewed as the policies and tools which would provide the country with the opportunity to 
develop.  
Spurred by its agreements with Brazil, beginning in 1988 Argentina began to 
implement far-reaching changes to prepare itself for participation in an regional 
economic agreement. The path of economic liberalization and reform followed by 
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Mexico served as an example to Argentina, which followed Mexico’s lead in 
implementing many of its economic reforms. Argentina and Mexico made a significant 
commitment to reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, and implemented fixed 
exchange rates. Both countries saw the implementation of a fixed exchange rate as a 
policy needed to stabilize their domestic economies and successfully establish economic 
ties to the international financial community, such as through regional trade agreements. 
In the late 1980’s, Argentina’s economic indicators showed that the country’s 
economy was in a state of crisis. In 1989, the inflation rate was 5000 percent, and thirteen 
of the 400 state-owned companies, which amounted to seven percent of the country’s 
GDP and over twenty percent of the country’s total gross investment, posted losses of 
four billion dollars (US) in 1989.42 Thus, it became clear that the large government role 
in state-owned enterprises and policies was not promoting the country’s economic 
growth. Although this crisis was pressing, the 1989 election of President Carlos Menem 
presented an opportunity for change. After entering office Menem began to enact a series 
of reforms designed to prepare Argentina for entrance into the regional and world market. 
Menem “seized the opportunity act against long held preferences for state ownership in 
Argentina.”43 By the end of 1989 Argentina passed two laws, known as the Economic 
Emergency Law and the State Reform Law, both of which allowed the Argentine 
government to begin the privatization process.  
Under Menem’s rule, the two laws passed allowed Argentina to rapidly privatize 
government-owned firms. Consequently, Argentina began selling state-owned enterprises 
such as airlines, oil companies, banks, and telecommunications. Through the privatization 
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of state-owned firms, the Argentine government made a profit of ten billion dollars; 
however, the privatization of state enterprises had several flaws and attracted a large 
amount of public criticism.44 During the process of privatization, Argentina was also 
struggling with high rates of unemployment. Although government-owned firms only 
amounted to three percent of the country’s total employment, many Argentines blamed 
the privatization process for the country’s unemployment woes.45 Menem was also 
criticized because many firms were not sold to the highest bidder and because the state 
failed to create a regulatory framework which would prevent the formation of 
monopolies. Presently, foreign companies and investors control the majority of assets and 
technological inputs of these newly privatized entities, which has also exacerbated public 
discontent with the privatization process among Argentines.  
Menem’s reforms have been described by scholars as “nothing short of a 
revolution,” and under his leadership Argentina has implemented the most extensive 
economic reforms in the country’s history.46 While Peron had established a welfare state 
in the 1940’s, Menem’s economic policies represented a radical departure, and he 
changed many of Argentina’s economic norms and institutions. The foreign control of 
major firms, technology, and market information created an economic structure in which 
small and medium-sized firms had limited access to these economic tools, thereby 
making their participation in Argentina’s new market economy extremely difficult. In 
addition to their limited access to technology and market information, limited credit 
availability also hindered their market participation. Whereas large firms paid interest 
rates ranging from eight to ten percent on business loans, small firms faced interest 
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payments which were significantly higher, ranging from fifteen to thirty-two percent.47 
Thus, the economic policies implemented to prepare Argentina for entrance into the 
regional and world market created a structure in which small and medium-sized firms 
found it difficult to compete against large, foreign-owned firms. 
While Menem’s liberal economic practices made it difficult for small firms to 
compete in open market structure, income distribution also worsened. Specifically, 
tensions arose regarding the distribution of funding between the central government of 
Buenos Aires and Argentina’s provinces. Even though the Argentine government 
increased provincial funding between 1990 and 1995, the start of the economic recession 
in 1995 led to dramatic cuts in government spending in the provinces.48 The deficit in the 
provinces climbed to three billion dollars, and although the provinces were excluded 
from Menem’s early privatization efforts, the provinces began to privatize their banks 
and limit local borrowing in an attempt to resolve their deficit.49 However, many of these 
economic reforms hit the small agricultural producers and firms centered in Argentina’s 
provinces quite hard. Although Argentina has a population of roughly thirty-seven 
million, over eighty-eight percent of the population is urban.50 The majority of this 
population is centered in the region around the capital of Buenos Aires, and which is 
known as Grand Buenos Aires, which is seen as the center of the country’s economic and 
political power. During the process of neoliberal economic reform and the movement 
towards regionalism, the provinces felt excluded and discounted from political dialogue 
and debate regarding these manners. Thus, when the provinces and small farmers began 
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to feel as though they were also economically excluded from the benefits of regionalism, 
many provinces witnessed the formation of social movements in protest of these politics 
and their effects.  
 Although Menem enacted sweeping economic changes with the belief that these 
policies would encourage the growth of Argentina’s economy, as the local level “social 
tension percolated.”51 Argentina did not enact safety net programs to protect its citizens 
from the distributional effects of economic reforms, choosing instead to follow the course 
established by privatization efforts and Cavallo’s Convertibility Plan. Despite the support 
that such reforms enjoyed among the Argentine elite, the poor and rural population began 
to protest the effects of these changes. The unprecedented use of executive power to 
enact many of the economic reforms made allowed the elite to make sweeping decisions, 
which may have come at the expense of some of Argentina’s citizens. Charges of 
corruption and mismanagement mounted, particularly in regards to the executive power 
used by Menem. While the previous Alfonsin administration used only eight “necessity 
and urgency” decrees, Menem passed over 12,000 executive decrees and 308 decrees of 
“necessity and urgency.”52 These executive and urgent decrees were used to enact the 
core of Menem’s economic reforms, leading many citizens, particularly the poor, to feel 
as though they were excluded from the decision-making process as well as the benefits of 
reform.  
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Economic Liberalization and Integration 
 The economic changes undergone in Mexico and Argentina during the late 1980’s 
and early 1990’s were extensive and signaled their countries commitment to participation 
in the second wave of regionalism and economic integration. However, the danger of 
such far-reaching reforms is that they will be politically unpopular and generate social 
unrest among Mexicans and Argentines. Scholars studying the movement towards 
economic liberalization and integration caution that:  
“Political commitment to liberal economic reforms in Latin America has been 
critical in the process thus far. The economic and ideological shift that has 
occurred in the last few years in Latin America is without historical precedent. 
The countries need to continue with these reforms while at the same time 
developing institutional mechanisms that help to consolidate these changes.”53 
 
Therefore, as Mexico and Argentina look forward to their full participation in regional 
trade agreements, they must carefully examine whether they enjoy the domestic support 
needed to consolidate economic integration without creating social disintegration. While 
certain sectors of society may find the adjustment costs resulting from the shift towards 
such policies to be unfavorable, political and economic leaders must constantly discern 
whether these costs promote economic integration as the expense of social integration. It 
is imperative that policy leaders examine their public support, or lacks thereof, to ensure 
that a majority of their citizens are committed to these reforms and experience the 
benefits of participation in a regional organization.  
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Chapter Four 
_______________________________ 
 
When NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994, a movement known as the 
Zapatista Army for National Liberation (EZLN) proclaimed war on Mexico’s 
government. Centered in the southern Mexican State of Chiapas, the Zapatistas chose to 
emerge on New Years Day because “the free trade treaty is the death certificate for the 
ethnic peoples of Mexico.”54 The occupation of San Cristóbal by five hundred members 
of the EZLN successfully attracted international and national attention to the social 
reaction, and the Zapatistas hoped that with the formation of their movement, “the whole 
neo-liberal project that Carlos Salinas represents is put in jeopardy.”55 By gaining control 
of San Cristóbal, the EZLN planned to challenge the significant economic and political 
changes which the Salinas administration had made to prepare Mexico for participation in 
NAFTA.  
President Salinas saw Mexico’s entrance into NAFTA as a positive opportunity 
for his country’s citizens. For Salinas, NAFTA was an invitation to participate in a 
regional organization which promised to boost his country’s economic performance, 
thereby allowing it to become a first world country. Mexico struggled economically 
during the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s, and a regional agreement with economically 
stable countries such as the United States and Canada provided an avenue through which 
Mexico could pursue sustainable economic growth. However, as the reaction formulated 
by the Zapatistas highlighted, certain sectors within Mexico believed that they were 
excluded from and were harmed by the changes their country had undergone in 
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preparation for entering NAFTA. The challenges issued by the Zapatistas demonstrated 
that Mexico’s attempt to transition from a third to a first world country through its 
participation in NAFTA would be a difficult and painful process.  
 
Changes in National Norms and Institutions 
 Throughout the 1980’s, Mexico’s political system was controlled by the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). During the mid- and late1980’s, Presidents 
Portillo, de la Madrid, and Salinas implemented a variety of neoliberal economic and 
political policies which departed from the institutional norms and practices established 
nearly eighty years prior, and it was these extensive changes which led to the formation 
of the EZLN. Although all three administrations made extensive economic reforms, the 
combination of the economic and political reforms made during the Salinas 
administration solidified the creation of the Zapatistas. In 1989, President Salinas 
announced the implementation of his “Reform of the Countryside” program, and in 1992, 
the New Agrarian Law reformed Article 27 of Mexico’s Constitution. This reform 
allowed the privatization of communal lands, known as ejidos, and facilitated Mexico’s 
transition from a state-centered corporatist to a market-oriented economic system. While 
the loss of agricultural subsidies and other neoliberal economic changes were painful, the 
revision of Constitutional Article 27 has been singled out by Subcomandante Marcos, the 
EZLN spokesperson, as the “detonating factor” which led the Zapatistas to emerge in 
public space.56 Believing that only the Mexican elite have benefited from these policies, 
and that the nation’s indigenous and rural populations have largely been excluded, the 
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Zapatistas established a movement which sought to reform the outward-oriented land and 
trade policies adopted by Salinas, specifically focusing on Article 27.  
 
Life in Chiapas: The Peasant and Indigenous Experience 
Mexico has a large indigenous population, and nearly forty percent of Latin 
America’s indigenous population is concentrated within Mexico.57 The State of Chiapas 
is known as “Mexico Profundo,” or Deep Mexico, as it is removed from the urban centers 
of political and economic power in Mexico City. Social and economic indicators 
establish a grim portrait of life in Chiapas, where malnutrition rates are high and life 
expectancy rates are five years shorter than those of non-Indians.58 Of the fifteen million 
Mexicans who live in conditions of extreme poverty, the majority are concentrated in one 
of Mexico’s 803 municipalities in which the population is predominately indigenous.59 
The State of Chiapas has roughly 3.2 million inhabitants, one-third of which are 
indigenous.60 Chiapas is divided into eight sections, and the state’s one million 
indigenous inhabitants are concentrated in Los Altos and the Lacondon, two of Chiapas’ 
poorest sections. Even within this remote southern state, there are marked disparities 
between the indigenous and non-indigenous population, and these disparities have 
contributed to tension between the elite and the non-elite. 
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Organizing Resistance 
On November 17, 1993, NAFTA was passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives, which signaled to Mexico and the international community that its 
passage was imminent. Although “many Mexicans have welcomed NAFTA as an 
undisguised blessing,” within Chiapas, the indigenous and peasant populations regarded 
NAFTA as an unwelcome death sentence.61 While the Salinas administration 
disseminated pro-NAFTA propaganda throughout Mexico, emphasizing that NAFTA 
was the gateway to economic prosperity, scholars warned that in the short term, policies 
associated with NAFTA “may only exacerbate the country’s already stark disparities and 
dislocations.”62 
Although the Zapatistas first attracted widespread national and international 
attention starting in 1994, the grievances claimed by the indigenous and farming 
population of Chiapas stretch back over nearly 500 years. The struggle for land control 
began under the leadership of Emiliano Zapata, a peasant leader who worked for land 
reform during the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Believing that Mexico’s rural population 
was discounted by the land-owning elite and the Mexican government, the early 
Zapatistas fought to gain control of land and to reform the political, social, and economic 
structures which inhibited their livelihoods and well-being.  
The influence which Emiliano Zapata exerts on the modern-day Zapatistas is 
unmistakable, and the EZLN follows the important example he set during his leadership 
of the Mexican Revolution. Beginning in 1909, Zapata was elected president of the 
Anenecuilco village council, and although it was a small position, he began to organize 
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citizens into parties which opposed the official government parties. In addition to 
organizing party opposition, Zapata also began organizing peasants in his home state of 
Morelos to help them gain access to land. During this period several land disputes 
occurred, and in 1910 Zapata and eighty armed man occupied disputed land in order to 
resolve the conflict.63 This initial occupation strengthened Zapata’s interest in land 
reform, and in November 1911, Zapata and Otilio Montaño worked together to write the 
Plan of Ayala. The Plan was important because it demanded land and water rights; 
however, the call for land was revolutionary because it “called not only for the return of 
property stolen by the haciendas but also for the expropriation of additional lands from 
the haciendas to give to landless peasants.”64 In addition to the Plan of Ayala, Zapata and 
his co-leaders declared themselves to be in rebellion against the government of Madero. 
During the Mexican Revolution, roughly two million citizens, or twelve percent of 
Mexico’s population of fifteen million, died during this struggle for access to land and 
other basic resources.65 However, this decade-long revolution was ultimately successful 
in its fight to establish peasant and indigenous access to land.  
Zapata’s efforts at land reform were influential within Mexico and his views were 
reflected in the new Constitution of 1917. In Article 27 of the new constitution, the 
government established the right to ejidos, or community-owned lands which were 
available for peasants to work and inhabit. The constitution also established guidelines 
for land reform, stating that land holdings greater than 100 hectares of good quality or 
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200 hectares of poor quality would be redistributed.66 Although Zapata and his followers 
were disappointed that the land reform enacted was not more extensive, the constitutional 
changes were an important step forward in the peasants’ quest for land. However, 
Zapata’s efforts were ended when he was assassinated on President Venustiano 
Carranza’s orders, and his death silenced a major threat to the established political, 
economic, and social order within Mexico. Despite his assassination, the formation of 
ejidos and the constitutional right to communal lands were established, and as a result 
over 70 million hectares of land have been distributed to about three million peasants.67   
 
The Formation of the EZLN 
It was ultimately the example set by Emiliano Zapata and his followers which 
encouraged the emergence of the modern-day Zapatistas. Described as “the most revered 
hero of the Mexican Revolution” and as a visionary, Zapata’s banner has deeply 
influenced the formation of the EZLN.68 The indigenous population of Chiapas believed 
that they were excluded from real political and economic power and that government 
policies and the divide between landowners and peasant workers tended to dehumanize 
the indigenous population. Therefore, in 1983 the modern-day Zapatistas were 
established, and began to organize and mobilize support among the indigenous 
population of Chiapas. The long history of exclusion of the indigenous population was 
evident by the poor social indices in Chiapas, which when compared to other Mexican 
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states, revealed that it had the highest rates of adult illiteracy, overcrowded housing, and 
lack of basic services such as electricity.69 
In 1983, the EZLN was formed by three members deep in the Lacandón Jungle. 
Although the organization of the Zapatista movement is largely shrouded in secrecy, 
several details have emerged which have led scholars to conclude that “these were not 
just a ragtag group of aggrieved and rebellious peasants.”70 In spite of their limited 
financial resources:  
“the several thousand fighters were undoubtedly part of a well-defined and 
coordinated structure, with a single command and a consistent political discourse. 
Their organizational capacity and logistics in communication, public relations, 
and military tactics and strategy revealed a group with years of preparation, and 
that included well-trained cadres and instructors.”71  
 
The organizations and parties which formed what is now known as the EZLN emerged 
during the 1960’s and 1970’s. During this period, revolutionary groups such as the 
Fuerzas de Liberacion Nacional (FLN) were formed to protect peasants from the violent 
and repressive attacks conducted by large landowners and Mexico’s government. In 
1982, the FLN began to network with similar organizations, such as the Union de Ejidos 
Tierra y Libertad and the Brigada Revolucionaria Emiliano Zapata.72 In 1983, the 
violence practiced against peasants and the indigenous population escalated under the 
leadership of Governor Dominguez, a retired army general. The increase in violence led 
to the formation of the EZLN on November 16, 1983 as six leaders from Northern 
Mexico emerged to unite groups such as the FLN and other recruited guerrilleros.73 In 
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this moment, the variety of organizations and individuals working for peasant rights and 
protection formed the EZLN.  
Even though the Zapatistas represent the peasants, in Chiapas the formation of the 
EZLN by non-indigenous peoples was problematic for the organization’s legitimacy. In 
its earliest stages, the EZLN began to organize itself militarily; however, if the 
organization hoped to expand to a larger audience, it would need to establish a broad base 
of popular support within the Lacandón Jungle. Thus, the early leaders of the EZLN 
formed an organizational structure which was egalitarian and communitarian in nature in 
order to form a strong base of population support among the indigenous population.74 
The indigenous population formed the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous 
Committees (CCRIs), organizations which ordered the voice of the indigenous 
community. There were at least four CCRIs spread throughout Chiapas, and these 
community organizations were headed by the CCRI General Command, which worked to 
incorporate the voices of each committee. The CCRIs played a critical role in 
determining the support and growth of EZLN policies, as the EZLN leadership had to
consult and involve its indigenous social
 
 base in its decisions and actions.  
                                                
In particular, scholars have been intrigued by the Zapatista’s military 
organization. While there have been many armed revolutionary movements, the 
formation of the EZLN is unique because it is an armed reformist movement. While it 
was clear to observers that “the EZLN had more people than weapons,” the goal of the 
movement’s armed operations is what differentiates it from other armed movements, 
which frequently used military force to spark a revolution or the overthrow of 
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government forces and officials.75 Instead of sparking a revolution, the Zapatistas hoped 
to transform Mexico into a true democracy which would take the voices and the well-
being of all Mexican citizens into account. Even though the Zapatistas were armed, they 
did not depend on their arms for survival; instead, they depended on the international 
attention and public opinion which observed and monitored their attempts to combat the 
powerful Mexican army.76 Although the Zapatistas initially used armed force to gain 
control of San Cristóbal, their use of arms after the initial occupation ceased because 
engaging in armed resistance with government forces would be futile.  
Although many of the Zapatistas were indigenous, the movement also attracted 
rural, non-indigenous members. Even at the highest levels of command within the 
organization, leaders such as Subcomandante Marcos were not indigenous, identifying 
himself as a “ladino,” or non-Indian. The EZLN’s supporters are divided into three 
categories: armed fighters, “milicianos” (aspiring armed fighters who are in training), and 
civilian supporters. Between 1,200 and 2,500 members of the EZLN were involved in the 
occupation of San Cristóbal; however, estimates place the number of total supporters at 
roughly 12,800.77 In addition to the actors directly involved in the Zapatista movement, 
the organization has received tremendous support from other groups within Mexico and 
from the international community.  
Although the EZLN is organized as a system of councils and collective 
leadership, Subcomandante Marcos has emerged as the Zapatistas spokesperson and most 
visible leader. Marcos’ leadership within the organization has been criticized by many 
who question the leadership that a fair-skinned criollo from Mexico City’s upper class 
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can offer to a movement which claims poor, indigenous farmers as its popular base. 
Despite the divergence in backgrounds, Marcos has been an important leader for the 
EZLN primarily due to his ability to communicate with ease in Spanish. Many of the 
movement’s followers speak one of a variety of indigenous languages, making 
communication among indigenous groups and with the news media and government 
officials difficult. Thus, Subcomandante Marcos, identified in 1995 by the Mexican 
government as Sebatián Guillén Vicente, has become the movement’s most popular 
figurehead. Although Marcos is a spokesperson for the movement, he is guided by 
collective Indian leadership; more specifically, by a directorate of Tzeltals, Tzotzils, 
Tojolabals, Zoques, and other Indian communities. Although these communities 
determined the direction of the organization, the indigenous leaders “thus far remained 
relatively silent and invisible,” and Marcos assumed the responsibility of communicating 
with the public.78  
 
New Year’s Day: The Public Emergence of the Zapatista Movement 
 Prior to their occupation of San Cristóbal, there had been no mention of the 
Zapatista movement in the international press. Although the major U.S. newspapers 
focused on the potential social and economic impacts of NAFTA on both the U.S. and 
Mexico, the EZLN did not receive any coverage in these media outlets. Even though 
Mexico’s Secretary of the Interior had monitored EZLN activities beginning in 1990 and 
despite the fact that the Mexican government was involved in several firefights with the 
EZLN beginning in May of 1993, the U.S. public and political leaders had no knowledge 
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of the Zapatistas movement prior to New Year’s Day 1994. The assassination of Cardinal 
Posadas on May 24, 1993 drew attention towards Guadalajara and away from the fighting 
between the Mexican government and the EZLN in Chiapas. 
On New Year’s Day 1994, the Zapatista Movement made its public debut, 
attracting the attention of national and international media and political leaders. On 
January 1, 1994, NAFTA went into effect in Mexico, and the Zapatistas chose this 
moment to begin their movement:  
“The Chiapas rebellion…was largely motivated by a series of convergent trends 
that had been in the making for several years in Mexico: the fall in world prices 
for coffee (the main crop in the Chiapas highlands), the dismantling of the old 
price-support system, the consciousness-raising effort carried out by priests and 
lay workers in the area, the organizational work undertaken by agrarian semi-
Maoist activists from the north, the eviction of indigenous communities from their 
land by cattle grazers and timber companies. None of these trends was recent; 
they were all set in motion some time ago. It just took time for them to come to 
fruition.”79 
 
Although the significant number of changes in the Mexican government’s economic and  
 
political structures, such as the alteration of Article 27, influenced the formation of the 
Zapatistas, it was not until Mexico made its formal entry into NAFTA that these forces 
would come to fruition. However, when these trends did come to fruition, they created 
one of the most powerful symbols of grassroots resistance to changing economic and 
political norms made in countries preparing for accession into regional trade agreements 
and organizations.  
Shortly after the New Year began, both men and women began to arrive in San 
Cristóbal de las Casas, the capital of the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. Their faces 
covered with dark masks, the group headed to strategically valuable locations throughout 
the city, and marched into the 31st of March Plaza, the city’s center of economic and 
                                                 
79 Castañeda, 41. 
 50
political power. The group focused their efforts on blockading the road, controlling the 
city’s two gas stations, and controlling the Municipal Palace, which housed the locality’s 
police station.  After gaining control of the police station, the group focused on 
blockading the square and began distributing leaflets. These leaflets declared that the 
group was at war against the Mexican government and labeled the Mexican Federal 
Army as “the basic pillar of the dictatorship under which [the Zapatistas] suffer[ed].”80 
Thus, the social movement known as the Zapatista Army of National Liberation began its 
protest of its country’s economic policies and participation in el Tratado de Libre 
Comercio (TLC), also known as NAFTA.  
  After gaining control of the city, the Zapatistas read the Declaration of the 
Lacandón Jungle, a document detailing the exploitation of Mexico’s indigenous peoples 
throughout the country’s history. One of the main goals of the EZLN was to force the 
resignation of President Carlos Salinas, the man they deemed responsible for the 
neoliberal economic and constitutional reforms. The EZLN believed that the reforms 
instituted by Salinas exacerbated the precarious economic, social, and political situation 
of the indigenous peoples. In fact, the EZLN’s leaders summarized their demands in 
eleven words: “trabajo, tierra, techo, pan, salud, educación, democracia, libertad, paz, 
independencia, y justicia (work, land, shelter, bread, health, education, democracy, 
liberty, peace, independence, and justice).”81  
Although Salinas offered a ceasefire to the EZLN on January 6, the EZLN never 
responded to his offer. Instead, they chose to quietly return to their base in the Lacandón 
Jungle. However, in February 1994, attempts at negotiation began between the CCRIs 
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and the designated Peace Commissioner, Manuel Camancho. In March 1994, Jornadas 
for Peace and Reconciliation were called by the Mexican government in an effort to 
promote understanding and cooperation between the Mexican government and the EZLN. 
Held in the cathedral of San Cristóbal, the world waited in anticipation, wondering if the 
EZLN and the Mexican government would be able to successfully formulate a peace 
agreement. The Zapatistas sent 19 delegates chosen by the CCRI to the meeting. Of the 
19, twelve were political leaders within the indigenous community, and seven were 
involved in the movement’s military activities, including Subcommandante Marcos. 
Marcos became an important spokesperson for the Zapatistas due to his ability to speak 
Spanish; the majority of the Zapatistas spoke one of ten traditional Mayan languages, 
which limited their ability to communicate with government officials and ladinos.  
At the meeting in San Cristóbal, the EZLN presented the government delegation 
with their demands in the form of a “pliego petitorio.” The Zapatistas had 34 points on 
their petition on which they hoped to reach an agreement with the Mexican government.  
The EZLN presented petitions for Salinas’s resignation, the revision of Constitutional 
Article 27 to return the original protections granted to ejidos, and the renegotiation of 
NAFTA to include provisions to protect the Mayan farmers from the cheap corn imports 
from the U.S. The demands made by the Zapatistas are noteworthy because they sought 
reformist and redistributive goals, rather than pure state power. Although the Zapatistas 
and the Mexican government reached a tentative agreement during the meeting, the 
Zapatistas could not yet fully accept the peace accords. Before doing so, they returned to 
the Lacandón Jungle to seek the approval of the people. This task was a daunting one 
which required the Zapatistas to meet with over 1,000 communities, a difficult task 
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considering that the peace proposal would have to be translated into a variety of 
indigenous languages.82 
Although international observers strongly believed that the Zapatistas would 
accept the peace accords, by late March the CCRIs had rejected the accords. The 
Committee claimed that the Mexican government “had broken the cease-fire by bombing 
an area along the Comitán-Altamirano highway and that troop strength in Chiapas had 
doubled.”83 This rejection was a major setback for the Mexican government, which had 
depended on the acceptance of the peace accords as a key to assuage the fears of foreign 
investors and the U.S. Government. Despite this setback, the Salinas administration 
began to employ a variety of spending measures in an attempt to curry favor among the 
Zapatistas and bring peace to the State of Chiapas.  
 
Social Spending: Mexico’s Response to EZLN Demands 
Ultimately, the social movement formed by the Zapatistas did change the policies 
of the Mexican government. In an attempt to diffuse the situation in Chiapas, the 
Mexican government instituted a series of economic measures designed to quell the 
violence in Chiapas, as well as the concerns of U.S. political leaders and foreign 
investors. On February 10, 1994, Salinas announced that the government would increase 
its spending in rural areas by 78 percent, and that 55 percent of this increase would be 
earmarked for social projects.84 During February, Salinas also announced a 350 million 
dollar (U.S.) spending program which would assist over 200,000 small coffee producers 
throughout the production process, and during March Salinas announced the 
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implementation of 600 new Solidarity projects.85 The federal funding for Chiapas 
skyrocketed, and between January and May of 1994, spending increased by 129 
percent.86 Spending was allocated for programs which would support small farmers 
producing goods such as “corn, beans, chile peppers, potatoes, cabbage, and tomatoes,” 
and which would also support the development of basic services such as electricity, 
potable water, and healthcare.87 Thus, the government’s main strategy in quelling the 
violence in Chiapas was to increase spending and establish a safety net for its citizens.  
The spending of these programs was strategically placed on the edges of areas 
held by the rebels. In total, the Salinas administration announced that it would spend 298 
million dollars (U.S.) in Chiapas in 1994.88 In addition to the millions of dollars spent on 
these programs, the government also pledged that it would employ workers implementing 
these programs seven dollars (U.S.) per day.89 While the Salinas administration would 
not agree to a re-negotiation of NAFTA to establish terms which would protect the small 
farmers in Chiapas, the increase in spending in the state signaled that the government was 
willing to establish a social safety net for those who perceived themselves to be excluded 
from the benefits of regional cooperation. Specifically, Salinas gave 24 million dollars 
(U.S.) to small farmers through the distribution of over 120,000 checks.90 The 
implementation of social spending programs were a success of sorts for the Zapatistas; 
although they were unable to agree with the government on a variety of demands, they 
successfully staged a social movement which captured national and international 
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attention, and ultimately led the Mexican government to implement programs which 
helped alleviate the perceived negative effects of Mexico’s neoliberal economic practices 
and participation in NAFTA. In due course, the movement formed by the EZLN sparked 
a desire for change among broader segments of the population, and as teachers and 
municipal workers began to rebel, the Mexican government was faced with the difficult 
task of maintaining support for its economic and political reforms in Chiapas amidst a 
“general climate of civil disobedience.”91  
 
Looking Forward 
 By the end of 1994, the EZLN had clearly rejected the government’s offers, and 
the negotiated peace never materialized. The reaction formulated by the Zapatistas in 
response to the changes in economic and political institutions made in preparation for 
NAFTA was widely publicized and drew attention and support from the international 
community. Although Mexico’s government desperately sought to quell the attention 
surrounding the Zapatistas, the measures used to do so were primarily financial in nature.  
The reforms offered to the Zapatistas made it clear that the government was not willing to 
make major changes at a political level, such as the revision of Article 27 or of the 
NAFTA treaty. Rather, many of the reforms instituted in an attempt to assuage the 
Zapatistas were financial in nature. The unwillingness or inability of Mexico’s 
government to meet the political demands of the Zapatistas allowed the conflict and 
international attention to continue for over a decade. Although the Zapatista Movement 
has changed significantly since its first appearance in public in 1994, it remains an 
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international symbol of a peasant grass-roots movement formed in response to changing 
national norms and the rise of regional organizations.  
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Chapter Five 
_______________________________ 
 
In June 1995 El Movimiento de las Mujeres en Lucha (MML) surged into 
Argentina’s public and political arena. During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, Argentina 
began to implement a variety of economic and political policies aimed at preparing the 
country for entrance into Mercosur and the world economy. However, by the mid-1990’s 
the changing government policies left Argentina’s small and medium-sized farmers 
without traditional protections, and many were in danger of losing their fields and farms 
to foreclosure. Renowned for its agriculture, the distinct culture of the Argentina’s small 
farmers has played an important role in the country’s history. Consequently, when the 
farmers began to perceive that they were excluded from the benefits of neoliberal 
economic practices and regional integration, their wives formed a social movement to 
protest their exclusion from the regional project and to protect their traditional way of life 
in the countryside.   
 
Menem’s Policy Changes        
 At the end of the 1980’s and during the 1990’s there were many changes in 
Argentina’s political economy as President Carlos Menem began to implement a variety 
of neoliberal economic policies. With Menem’s election as president in 1989 the second 
era of neoliberalism began, and Menem opened the economy to foreign capital. This 
period marked the beginning of an era of “international collaboration” with the 
participation of Argentina in the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the 
 57
World Bank and with the implementation of the convertibility system in 1991.92 With the 
opening of the economy and the implementation of a fixed exchange rate, inflation rates 
began to rise and Argentina became vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. 
This vulnerability was exacerbated by the economic crises in Mexico and Brazil, both of 
which deepened Argentina’s domestic economic woes. At the same time, Menem began 
to privatize the majority of the publicly-owned businesses, selling them below their 
market value. As a result of these economic practices, Argentina’s external debt began to 
rise, and inequality and poverty rates also increased during this era. While certain sectors 
within Argentina benefited from the country’s participation in Mercosur and other 
regional organizations, other sectors, such as small farmers, perceived themselves to be 
excluded from the benefits of economic integration.  
 The change in Argentina’s economic model was particularly difficult for the 
country’s small farmers. Argentina is well-known for its agricultural products, and its 
farmers were “historically the engine of the country.”93 Menem was elected to the 
presidency on a platform based on a “production and wage revolution,” and he promised 
that this platform would provide Argentina’s small farmers with the economic support 
and policies needed to modernize their outdated systems and increase their efficiency.94 
The majority of Argentina’s small farms were family-owned enterprises which lacked the 
funds needed to modernize their systems of production. Trusting in Menem’s campaign 
promise, many small farmers financed the modernization of their farms by taking out 
credit from provincial and national banks. Believing that Menem would continue the 
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country’s traditional economic policies which protected and provided for Argentine 
farmers, many families used credit to pay for new tractor and planter models.   
 However, with the opening of the countryside to international trade and the 
convertible currency, the prices of exported goods fell and small farmers were unable to 
pay their debts. In 1996 La Sociedad Rural Argentina estimated that “the debt of the 
country surpassed 100 billion dollars (US)” and that the interest rates for new loans were 
15%.95 Many of the farmers’ fields were mortgaged as a guarantee of their debt, and 
during this period 12,500,000 hectares were mortgaged to the Banco de la Nación 
alone.96 The decline in provincial spending, as well as the privatization of provincial 
banks signaled that Menem was committed to neoliberal economic reforms and preparing 
Argentina for economic integration, even though the small farmers perceived themselves 
to be excluded from these economic benefits. While small farmers had taken out credit to 
enhance the competitiveness of their family enterprises, the change in Argentine 
economic and political policies made it difficult for small farmers to pay back their debts 
and placed many landowners in a precarious position.  
 
Gender Roles in Rural Argentina 
 Before the establishment of the MML, women in the countryside did not have a 
role in rural Argentine politics. In Argentina, the rural areas outside of the capital city of 
Buenos Aires are known for being quite conservative and for “machismo,” a culture 
which glorifies the man. In rural areas men and women divide the work according to 
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traditional gender roles, with the men in charge of the fieldwork and the women in charge 
of the housework.  
The division of work also corresponds to a family structure which is more rigid 
that the family structures in the larger cities, such as Buenos Aires. In the rural areas “the 
extended family is hierarchically organized, and governed by the father.”97 The man 
“leads the agricultural activities” and “feels total liberty to make decisions which involve 
the rest of the family.”98 The men belonged to the agricultural organizations and 
cooperatives and there was not a forum within agricultural organizations such as the 
Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA) for the women. The women could not sell 
agricultural products in their own name, and although they were able to sell agricultural 
products in their husbands’ names and were expected to help in the fields during harvest 
periods, they spent the majority of their time in the home.99  
 With this strong division of labor in the rural areas, women’s participation in the 
political and public field was limited. In the rural areas the men dominated the public 
forum, and the women dominated the public forum. There was the belief that “a woman 
who takes good care of her husband, her children, and her house does no have time to 
leave, and she should remain in the house.”100 Even though the women participated in the 
selling and production of goods, it was uncommon for them to participate politically and 
“when decisions had to be made, it was rare for the women to open her mouth, as her 
husband always spoke for her.”101 There was not space for women in the political arena, 
                                                 
97 K.A. Stolen, La Decencia de la Desigualdad: Genero y Poder en el Campo  
   Argentino (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Antropofagia, 2004), 69. 
98 Stolen, 69.  
99 Silvia Cloquell, Familias Rurales: El fin de una historia en el inicio de una nueva  
   Agricultura (Rosario, Argentina: Homo Sapiens Ediciones, 2007), 47 
100 Stolen, 135.  
101 Karina Bidaseca, “Colono/as Insurgentes: Discursos heréticos y acción colectiva por  
 60
and the men continued to dominate the political and public spaces in the agricultural 
organizations and the social movements.  
 
The Formation of the MML   
 The division between gender roles in rural areas was quite strong, and while men 
dominated the public space, women traditionally dominated privates spaces, such as the 
home. However, in 1995 a great change occurred among the women in the countryside: a 
cry from La Pampa began a new chapter in which rural women began to participate in the 
political process. The women began to organize because the economic policies 
implemented by Menem created a debt crisis in the countryside. While men traditionally 
led social movements and political protests, the men did not organize against the 
foreclosures because they were depressed and embarrassed, believing that the debt 
signaled that they had failed to provide adequately for their families.102 Noting the 
change in their husbands’ attitudes, the women began to organize themselves to defen
their families and their land from the effects of Menem’s neoliberal economic policies. 
While Menem had promised that integration into Mercosur would benefit all Argentine
the women in the countryside believed that regional integration was hurting, rather th
helping, their families.  
d 
s, 
an 
                                                                                                                                                
 On May 27, 1995 a banker arrived at the house of Lucy de Cornelis, a housewife 
in the town of Winifreda in the region of La Pampa, to announce the foreclosure of her 
family’s property. Desperate, de Cornelius decided to go to the radio station and “tell 
what happened to me and hope that there were more women with the same experiences 
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who were also willing to organize.”103 During this moment, these women formed “a new 
collective identity” because they each identified with the problems created by 
Argentina’s debt, which stemmed from neoliberal economic policies.104 For these 
women, losing their land symbolized the loss of their culture.105 Believing that “[the 
debt] wasn’t an individual situation” and that their husbands were not to blame, the 
women began to raise their neighbors’ consciousness and worked to communicate tha
many small farmers were struggling in similar situations.
t 
bly meeting.  
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began to leave the privacy of their individual homes, and began to transition into the 
public area of collective action. This transition was solidified on June 3, 1995, when the 
MML held its first general assem
 The MML, the social movement formed by the spouses of small farmers, is a 
social movement which emerged from civil society.107 This social movement emerged in 
1995, during a period in which there had been a nationwide increase in social movements 
by groups who perceived themselves to be excluded from the benefits of regional 
integration and changes in economic policies.108 These social movements were directed 
towards producing transformations for the groups which found their new economic and 
political positions intolerable; in the case of the MML, the women wanted to transform 
the difficult situation facing small farmers.109 The participation of these women in the 
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MML “politicized their everyday lives” and the women came to feel that their role as a 
woman was to protect their family from the dangers of foreclosure.110  
 The women who participated in the MML had a long family history in the 
countryside, and many of their grandparents settled in one of Argentina’s provinces after 
immigrating from France or Italy. Their grandparents fought to obtain fields to farm, and 
it is this fight which has inspired the women. On June 25, 1912 the Grito de Alcorta was 
the first strike launched by the immigrants who worked as agricultural laborers. The 
immigrants fought the modification in the rent contracts that they had established with 
larger landowners.111 Even though the MML is not directly linked to any previous social 
movement, the Grito de Alcorta set an important example for the women. Even though 
women were not direct participants in the strike, they played an important role in 
encouraging their husbands to fight against the land-owning oligarchy and to attain a 
better life for their families.112 The powerful example set by their ancestors has 
encouraged the women of the MML to fight to maintain rights to the land women by their 
parents and grandparents.  
 The history behind the name of the MML provides interesting insight into the 
movement’s goals. The women included “mujeres” in the name because it was the 
women who organized the response to the crisis created by the debt and the foreclosures 
in the countryside. Although there was some dissension, the women included “en lucha” 
because they were actively fighting the debt structure and Menem’s changing economic 
policies. In some provinces the movement was called “El Movimiento de las Mujeres 
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Agropecuarias en Lucha.” However, in the province of Santa Fe, “agropecuarias” was 
removed because the women wanted to include all women, whether they were wives of 
farmers or not, who identified with their fight.113 
 For the majority of the women who participated in the MML, their participation 
was their first experience in the public and political arena. The women participated 
because they felt that it was their role as mothers and housewives to protect their lifestyle 
from the danger posed by foreclosures. The traditional gender roles in the countryside 
which confined women to the home meant that the majority of the movement’s 
participants were unfamiliar with economic and political dialogue, as their only previous 
organizational experience was their participation in the parents’ organizations at their 
children’s schools.114 Even though some of the MML’s participants were lawyers or were 
employed in other professional careers, the vast majority were housewives who finished 
their schooling at the end of either elementary or secondary school. Therefore, many of 
the women lacked a basic knowledge or comprehension of the economic and political 
issues facing their country.  
 But with the debt crisis and the foreclosures in the countryside, the women had 
the opportunity to form a deep knowledge of Argentina’s economy and politics. Before 
the crisis many of the women lived a “fantasy life,” and were unaware of the credit that 
their husbands took out to finance their farm.115 The women learned about the economic 
effects from their family’s economic situation and “from looking at their own purses.”116 
Women involved in the MML began to read the newspapers, listen to radio programs, 
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and watch the news broadcasts on the television. By immersing themselves in different 
forms of media, the women began increase their knowledge of Argentine economic and 
political policies. The women also began to meet amongst themselves in small groups to 
discuss and develop their own opinions about these themes.117 Through these various 
methods, the women of the MML gained a better understanding their government’s 
policies and the changes made in traditional economic and political structures as Menem 
prepared Argentina for integration into Mercosur.  
 
The Structure of the Movement 
 The MML is a social movement; therefore, its structure is not as formal as those 
found in non-governmental organizations or in political parties. The MML does not have 
a rigid meeting schedule, and at times months may pass in between meetings. The 
movement does not have headquarters or a physical center of activity, and while critics 
may charge that this decentralized structure signals the movement’s weakness, the MML 
believes that it creates a movement in which “all are equal” and in which all the women 
have the opportunity to participate.118 Even though the MML lacks a formal structure, the 
women do utilize certain networks and methods to organize themselves to fight against 
the debt.  
 The MML is a nation-wide social movement which plays an important role in 
many of Argentina’s provinces, such as Santa Fe, La Pampa, and Buenos Aires. The 
movement’s national leaders are Lucy de Cornelis, the movement’s founder and 
president, and Ana Galmarini, the movement’s vice president. In additional to the 
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movement’s national leaders, the MML also has leaders at the provincial level. In the 
Province of Santa Fe, Ana Galmarini, the national vice-president, is the provincial 
president. Although the movement has national and provincial leaders, the women are not 
elected to these offices; rather, in keeping with the MML’s decentralized structure and 
egalitarian goals, the women decide amongst themselves who will assume office. 
 Even though the MML does not have a rigid meeting schedule, it does organize 
meetings at the national and provincial level. An annual meeting known as the “Mesa 
Nacional,” is held in the town of Rosario and attracts women from all of Argentina’s 
provinces. Because of the great distances and travel costs associated with attending such 
a meeting, the women only hold this meeting one time per year.119 Even though these 
meetings are important, the Mesa Nacional has not been held in over two years due to the 
high costs of transportation. At the provincial level, the organization of meetings is quite 
different. Unlike the Mesa Nacional, there is no fixed meeting schedule. Each zone and 
province is autonomous and the women decide where, when, and how frequently 
meetings will be held. The number of meetings held is dependent on the situation of each 
zone. During crisis periods, such as before the trial which involved the leaders of the 
MML began, the women met at least once a week to organize and plan their response. 
Although national and provincial meetings are an important part of the MML’s structure, 
the high costs involved in attending such meetings means that they may occur 
infrequently depending on the situation within a given region.  
 Even though the MML has national and provincial leaders and meetings, the 
movement is not organized in a bureaucratic or centralized manner. Although some 
critics may state that the decentralized structure of the movement shows that the MML is 
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a weak movement, the women involved see the movement’s loose structure as an 
advantage. For the MML it is important that the movement is “horizontal, pluralist, and 
democratic,” and that all of the women are equal to each other.120 The MML’s structure 
is very flexible, and the absence of a bureaucracy gives the women the opportunity t
“maximize solidarity” and “stimulate social experimentation and internal discussion.”
o 
                                                
121 
Within this structure the women have the organization and flexibility needed to attract a 
greater number of women to participate in their movement, which is truly open to all. In 
the MML, “no one is worth more than anyone else,” and the movement has the tools 
needed to adapt itself to a variety of distinct situations and events.122 
 
The Goals of the Movement 
 There are a variety of goals that the women have already reached and goals which 
they hope to reach in the near future. The MML is a unique social movement because the 
women are reactive and proactive; reactive because they are “oriented towards resisting 
the changes connected to modernization,” and regional integration and proactive because 
they want to implement policies and obtain resources which will protect the future of 
Argentina’s small farmers.123 The women plan to change their government’s policies by 
participating in meetings, foreclosures, marches, and publicizing their situation through 
radio stations. The heavy debt burden in the Argentine countryside has created a crisis 
situation as many small farmers who lost their lands have moved to the slums, or “villas 
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de misería,” surrounding Argentina’s large cities.124 By utilizing a variety of different 
methods, the women hope to change the reality faced by Argentina’s small farmers and 
ensure a future for small and medium sized agricultural producers within Argentina.  
 The foundation of the MML is the rising debt faced by the small farmers. 
Between 1988 and 2002, the number of farmers in the province of Santa Fe fell from 
36,844 to 28,034, a decrease of 24 percent, as changes in government spending and the 
privatization of provincial banks caused many small farmers to lose their fields in 
foreclosures.125 The women acknowledge that the debt does exist; however, they believe 
that the debt is unjust. The women of the MML are fighting to change the structure of the 
debt and are asking for “twenty years of refinance” to pay their debts.126 The MML wants 
to refinance the debt because the interest rates due increased markedly during Argentina’s 
economic crisis and the end of Menem’s convertible currency regime. The MML’s main 
goal is to refinance the debt in a plan which allows small farmers to simultaneously pay 
off their debt while maintaining their traditional lifestyle in the countryside.  
 One important event related to the refinancing of the debt is the privatization of 
the Banco de la Nación. In March 1998, the MML and other groups and individuals 
which are in solidarity with the movement formed a “historic and massive circle around 
the central building of the Banco Nación” in an attempt to thwart Menem’s plans to 
privatize the bank.127 The privatization of the Banco Nación would signal a loss of a 
credit source, in addition to the 12 million hectares which were mortgaged through the 
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bank.128 The women want Argentina’s financial institutions to remain under Argentine 
control, because if the bank was sold to a foreign enterprise, the main goal of the bank 
would be the accumulation of wealthy, and it would begin to institute policies which “are 
not in the interests of the citizens.”129 The MML protested outside the Banco Nación on 
the day it was to be privatized; however, Menem did not sign the privatization contract. 
For the women, this was an important achievement because had it been privatized, the 
farmers would have been unable to refinance their debt.130 In 2001, the MML conducted 
another march outside of the Banco Nación to continue the fight against the bank’s 
privatization. Through their marches and protests, the women successfully prevented the 
bank’s privatization, which was a major achievement for the MML.   
 Another goal of the MML is to prevent the concentration and purchase of land by 
foreigners, because the presence of large and wealthy foreign landowners makes it 
difficult for the small farmers to compete. In 2001 the Argentine Census on 
Agroproducers revealed that the 936 most powerful land owners held 35,515,500 
hectares, and that 137,021 small producers held only 2,288,000 hectares.131 The largest 
landowners were Benetton, Cresud, Bunge, and Amaliz Lacroze. These four landowners 
hold the title to two million hectares, an area equivalent in size to the country of 
Belgium.132 The women of the MML believe that the government’s policies support the 
large foreign owners, not the small farmers, and that these policies are particularly 
egregious because many foreign owners do not inhabit their land or participate in the 
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culture of Argentina’s provinces. Therefore, a major goal for the MML is to establish 
policies and practices which limit the concentration of land in the hands of foreigners.  
 For the MML the concentration of the land is a great danger because many small 
producers, unable to compete with larger enterprises, are selling their lands to foreign 
companies and owners. Many of the towns in the countryside have become “ghost 
towns,” and are symbolic of the threat that the growing concentration of land owned by 
foreign entities pose to small farmers.133 In 2002, the average size of farming enterprises 
increased by 33.6 percent; therefore, the women believe that it is critical that the 
Argentine government limit the number of hectares that foreigners and large landowners 
can purchase.134 The women are also asking for agricultural subsidies and price supports 
for small farmers. Argentina’s integration into Mercosur led to a reduction in subsidies 
and provincial spending, and small farmers found it difficult to modernize their farming 
equipment and sell their products without these supports. The MML argues that the 
European Union, the United States, and Japan spend 1000 million dollars each day to 
“protect and sustain their farmers and livestock owners.”135 The concentration of land in 
foreign hands and the lack of subsidies create a situation in which Argentina’s small 
farmers are unable to compete in the world market; therefore, the women are fighting to 
limit the number of hectares sold to foreigners and to lobby for government subsidies to 
underwrite the costs involved in production.  
 In recent years, the economic situation has somewhat improved in the countryside 
because the number of foreclosures has decreased. The Argentine government has halted 
the number of foreclosures, believing that the foreclosures have generated a social and 
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political response from groups such as the MML, which protest the foreclosures, which is 
working against the government.136 Even though this is a significant policy change, the 
MML continues to work for change in the countryside. For the women, “the cessation of 
the foreclosures was the opportunity to see what more we could do,” and the MML is 
currently working on other issues such as education and healthcare in Argentina’s rural 
areas.137 The implementation of neoliberal economic policies and the rise in foreclosures 
caused a decline in the rural population, which is linked to the closure of many rural 
schools. In the rural areas, it is now very difficult to reach a school, whether it is 
elementary school or a university. Many of the women involved in the MML are 
housewives and have children; therefore, these issues will be an integral part of their fight 
as the movement looks towards its future.  
 
The Methods Used to Achieve Change 
 The MML is best known for its presence at foreclosures. Although long distances 
and high transportation costs have prevented the MML from establishing a schedule for 
formal meetings, the women organize their participation in the foreclosures through a 
telephone network. It is cheaper for the women to use the telephone, and “one woman 
calls another, and she calls another.”138 In the countryside, internet access is difficult to 
obtain, and it is difficult to hold meetings; therefore, when notice of a foreclosure is 
received, the MML uses the telephone to notify its members and organize the 
participation of as many women as possible.  
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 Participants in the MML believe that the foreclosures and the debt faced by the 
small farmers are unjust; therefore, they are using their social movement to stop the 
foreclosures and to ask the government to refinance the debt. The MML is characterized 
by its practices of civil disobedience, and unlike Mexico’s Zapatista movement, it does 
not use violence or weapons.139 During the beginning stages of the movement, the 
women improvised and decided to protest the foreclosures, and were greatly surprised 
when they successfully stopped a foreclosure.140 Protesting the foreclosures has become 
the movement’s trademark, and the women consider their presence at the foreclosures to 
be a legal protest against foreclosures which they see as illegal.141  
 Another method that the women use to attract attention is marches. The women 
participate in marches and protests in many places; however, they are known best for 
their participation in the march on International Women’s Day. On March 8, 1996, the 
MML’s march in Buenos Aires attracted attention from Argentines and from 
international observers. The women marched from the plaza in front of Argentina’s 
Congress to the Casa Rosada, Argentina’s presidential palace, and one woman, Norma de 
Astorquia, led the march on a tractor.142 Roughly 800 women participated in the march, 
and they were supported by many men and Argentine Congressional leaders.143 The 
women brought a petition to President Menem listing their demands, asking for changes 
such as “the immediate suspension of foreclosures,” twenty-five years to pay their debt, 
and new forms of credit that could be used to allow small farmers to continue their 
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agricultural production.144 The day after the march, La Nación, a major Argentine 
newspaper, ran a front-page article on the MML and its march through Buenos Aires, 
with a picture of Norma de Astorquia and her tractor. The women’s story attracted 
international attention, and organizations in countries as far away as France offered 
support for the women’s movement.145 
 The media has been another important method used to promote the goals of the 
MML. When the women participate in foreclosures, marches, or protests, they use a 
telephone network to contact as many media outlets as possible. Radio stations, 
newspapers both large and small, and television news outlets are examples of some of the 
media outlets that the women contact in their efforts to draw attention to their movement. 
In particular, the MML focuses on the large newspapers as some of them, such as La 
Nación, have a national as well as an international readership.146 Communication outlets 
provide the MML with the opportunity to raise awareness of the movement both within 
and outside of Argentina, and the women hope to construct a worldwide network of 
solidarity for their cause.  
 Even though news of the MML runs in Argentina’s newspapers and news 
programs, the women’s main medium of communication is the radio. The MML began 
when Lucy’s desperate pleas were broadcasted on the radio, and even today the women 
continue to use the radio to announce their presence at foreclosures. One of the major 
obstacles faced by the MML is that they lacking sufficient funding for publicity; 
however, the women can use one of the many radio stations throughout the countryside 
which stand in solidarity with the women’s movement free of charge. In the town of 
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Maceal, radio station 94.3 FM stands in solidarity with the MML. Even though 94.3 FM 
only broadcasts to a zone which is equivalent to 10 kilometers, the women’s 
advertisements on the station attract seventy or more supporters to a foreclosure.147 
Despite the small zone and audiences reached by these radio stations, they remain 
important to the MML because they facilitate the growth of a network of solidarity in 
between the MML and the small farmers in the Argentine countryside.  
 
The MML: An Autonomous Organization  
 One of the defining characteristics of the MML is that it is an autonomous 
organization. The movement does not have formal ties with other organizations such as 
the FAA, political leaders such as members of Argentina’s Congress, or with Argentina’s 
political parties. The MML believes that the FAA has failed its stated goal of protecting 
small farmers, and that the political parties fail to realize their platform promises once 
they arrive in office.  
 On August 15, 1912, the FAA was founded as an organization which would “join 
together small and medium sized farmers.”148 Even though many of the husbands of the 
women involved in the MML had participated in the FAA and had close ties with the 
organization, within the organization there was not a space for the women to participate. 
All of the leaders of the presidents of the FAA were male, and the women felt that the 
FAA failed to realize that women wanted to participate as well. As the FAA developed, it 
became a meeting space in which the men would gather to discuss topics and issues 
affecting the lives of the small farmers.  
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 Even though the FAA stated that it supported small farmers and that the 
organization’s goal was to defend them, within the MML there is a shared sentiment  that 
the FAA abandoned them during their time of need. The stated goal of the FAA is to 
“develop sustainable agricultural practices;” however, the organization did not involve 
itself in the debt controversy, nor did it have a presence at the foreclosures which 
threatened the very survival of the small farmers.149 The MML’s participants believe that 
the FAA has abandoned its stated goal of protecting small farmers, and that if the 
organization hopes to continue to fight for small farmers, it needs to conduct a self-
evaluation. If the FAA is truly working to defend small farmers, the MML believes that it 
cannot afford to ignore the threats posed by the debt and the foreclosures.   
 The lack of concern that the FAA showed for the small farmers during this period 
was an important event which sparked the formation of the MML. While the MML is not 
tied in any way to the FAA, at times the women do work with the Federación Chacarero. 
The Federación Chacarero is “an organization which opposes the FAA,” and unlike the 
FAA, the Chacareros do address the debt and other threats which place the future of small 
farmers in peril.150 When the goals of the MML are aligned with those of the Federación 
Chacarero, the two movements participate in marches, strikes, and foreclosures together.  
 Although the MML does work with The Federación Chacarero, it does not have 
formal ties or linkages to any political party. Among the women, there is a general 
consensus that the political parties do not support the small farmers in the countryside, 
and that their primary interests are in serving the urban population. Corruption within the 
Argentine government and political parties are important issues for the women, and many 
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of them do not trust their government leaders. The women believe that although many 
candidates campaign with platforms promising policy changes and new ideas to improve 
life in the countryside, after the elections these promises are never realized. Despite the 
efforts on the part of the political parties to attract the support of small farmers and the 
MML, the women’s lack of trust and belief that there is no one political party which 
represents the interests of the countryside has led them to work outside of established 
political parties.  
 Although the MML currently eschews ties with all political parties, when the 
MML first began, it has a loose connection with the FREPASO party in the province of 
La Pampa. However, the relationship between the MML and FREPASO was short-lived. 
The alliance between the MML and FREPASO led many women to leave the MML 
because they supported other parties and political ideologies and believed that the 
movement had moved away from its founding principles by establishing ties with 
FREPASO. In the province of Santa Fe, no formal ties exist between political parties and 
the MML, or between Congressional leaders and the MML. Even though political parties 
such as ARI have sought to establish ties with the MML, the women say that they are 
“anti-partisan” even though “they are making politics.”151 Although the women within 
the MML may discuss political candidates or political parties, the movement is not 
formally tied to a political candidate or party.  
 There are a variety of women within the MML, and for the women it is important 
that the movement fosters an environment in which all the women feel comfortable 
participating in the movement. Because the MML is not tied to a particular political 
party, the movement has established an environment which is welcoming to women from 
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a variety of political allegiances. While some women show their lack of confidence in the 
government and vote in protest by leaving their ballots blank, other women may become 
heavily involved in projects coordinated by specific political parties if the project is in 
accordance with their personal beliefs and values. The women involved in the MML 
believe that the Argentine government and Argentina’s political parties do not have the 
best interests of the small farmers at the heart of its policies, and it is this belief which has 
led the women to work outside of the government and the political parties in an effort to 
achieve change.  
 
The MML in the Judicial Field 
 On September 12, 2003, the MML went through an important period of change. 
Beforehand, the MML had relied on marches and protests at foreclosures to attract 
attention to their cause and to change the economic policies implemented in Argentina. 
However, in 2003, the MML protested the foreclosure of Ricardo Vasallo, who was in 
danger of losing his 40 hectare farm in Chivilcoy. During the protest, the women 
followed their traditional routine of singing the Argentina’s national anthem and 
peacefully attempting to prevent the banker from completing the foreclosure. 
 However, this protest turned out to be quite different from the others in which the 
MML routinely participated. The police arrived at the scene accompanied by a judge, and 
the women participating in the protest were detained. The women were detained for many 
hours and claimed that the police treated them violently during their arrests.152 The judge 
accused the MML’s leaders of resisting authority, and presented the women with a plea 
deal. However, the women refused to accept the proposed deal of probation, because to 
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accept it “would mean recognizing that we had committed a crime.”153 Also, if the 
women did accept probation, the terms of the deal would forbid their participation in 
future foreclosures; therefore, the women decided to reject the judge’s offer. 
 With their decision to reject the judge’s offer of probation, the women’s case went 
to trial. The trial began on March 23, 2007, and many agrarian organizations, 
Congressional leaders, and various social organizations arrived to show their support for 
the women and to present a petition asking for their acquittal. The trial lasted six days, 
during which the women’s supporters maintained a constant presence within the 
courtroom. On March 29th, the trial ended, and based on the testimony of witnesses, the 
judge declared “the total acquittal of all of the accused.”154 For the MML, the acquittal 
was a great success and an important milestone for the movement because the judge 
decided that their practice of civil disobedience was not illegal.  
 The trial was a great success for the leaders of the MML, and it also put the 
foreclosure they had been protesting on September 12, 2003 under scrutiny. During the 
trial, various witnesses testified that “there is a group of bankers who keep the goods 
obtained during the public foreclosures, selling them at extremely low prices.”155 An 
investigation began into this ring which was formed by the banks performing the 
foreclosures and who were then selling the fields at prices which were significantly lower 
than the land’s stated value. Richard Vallejo’s fields, for example, were valued at 12 to 
15 thousand pesos per hectare; however, the bank sold his property for 3,800 pesos per 
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hectare.156 The judge froze the foreclosure of Vallejo’s property and ordered that an 
investigation into the practices used by banks to sell these foreclosed properties.  
 While the judge’s suspension of the foreclosures was important for the Vallejo 
family, the decision also had wider ramifications. The investigation signaled that a 
change in policies, which would protect all the small farmers in danger of losing their 
homes and fields to foreclosures, could occur. The judge’s investigation meant that in the 
future, it would be extremely difficult for banks to sell foreclosed properties at unfair 
prices which were far below the land’s market value. The suspension of foreclosures 
could result in the implementation of laws and policies which would assure that the banks 
sold foreclosed properties at prices which reflected their true market value. Through their 
trial, the MML achieved more than a validation of its social protest methods; it also 
caused the judge to suspend the foreclosures and investigate whether the banks were 
selling the land at fair prices. The corruption and changing economic policies involved in 
the mounting debt and foreclosures posed severe threats to Argentina’s small farmers. 
Unlike the Zapatistas, the MML was unable to encourage Argentina to establish spending 
programs which would form a social safety net for its small farmers; however, it was able 
to encourage the Argentine government to examine the fairness of the policies and 
practices implemented by President Menem as he prepared Argentina for integration into 
Mercosur.  
 
The Movement’s Future 
 Presently, both the women within the MML and outside observers are unsure 
about the movement’s future will bring. The MML was formed spontaneously, and its 
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roots are formed in the reaction of the women in the countryside who faced losing their 
land and their lifestyle. Although the MML has become an influential political actor 
within Argentina, the women need to implement several changes in order to sustain the 
movement into the future. 
 The MML is a social movement, not a political party. Although it lacks the 
structure of a formally organized party, there are certain patterns and structures within the 
movement. The telephone network, which is used to coordinate the women’s arrival at 
foreclosures in the countryside or marches in Buenos Aires, is one such example. If there 
is a foreclosure in the province of Santa Fe, a designated contact with telephone another 
woman within the province, who will in turn contact other women. Through the use of 
their telephone network, the women facilitate the arrival of dozens and sometimes 
hundreds of supporters at events such as foreclosures, marches, or strikes.  
 One of the largest obstacles faced by the MML is the limited availability of 
financial funds and other resources. The MML is a national movement; however, 
Argentina is a very large country, meaning that the women must travel many hours and 
kilometers to arrive at foreclosures and marches. The women are fighting to defend their 
families who are in danger of losing their land due to their high levels of indebtedness, 
thereby making it difficult for women to ask their families for financial support. The 
financial burden of funding travel to the movement’s events is the responsibility of each 
woman, who must draw on her own personal funds. The movement does request financial 
support for travel from agrarian organizations, political leaders, and members of 
Argentina’s Congress. Although the women do occasionally receive financial funding 
from political organizations or leaders, the women never accept funds if the organization 
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or leader attaches conditions which would threaten or compromise the movement’s 
autonomy. Financial resources remain an critical issue when discussing the movement’s 
future, and it is important for the women to devise ways in which they can generate the 
funds needed to travel to the movement’s events.  
 Even though funding is an important issue, the future of the MML’s membership 
is another important topic. When the movement began, the average age of its participants 
was 45 years; however, many of the women are now approaching 60 years of age.157 
Attracting young women to the movement is difficult because many of them leave the 
rural areas to pursue a university education or a career in Argentina’s urban areas. These 
trends among rural youth present a problem for the movement’s future. While the MML 
is fighting to preserve the traditional lifestyles and cultures of the small rural farmers, the 
youth are seeking new opportunities and lifestyles outside of the rural areas.  
 The changes in Argentina’s economy have also changed the economic situation in 
the rural areas, as well as the goals of the MML. With the end of the currency 
convertibility and the growth of soy, the small farmers who export their soy goods no 
longer occupy the same precarious position as they did during the MML’s formation. 
“The soy boom was one of the pillars of the national economy’s recovery,” and the fertile 
fields around the city of Rosario in the province of Santa Fe are filled with soybeans.158 
From 2002 to 2003, small Argentine farmers produced 70 million tons of agricultural 
products, 35 million of which were soy goods, amounting to roughly half of all 
agricultural goods harvested.159 The soy boom has played an important role in the 
economic recovery of Argentina and the livelihood of its small farmers, and today 
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farmers harvesting soy crops are not in as precarious position as they were during the 
early 1990’s.  
 Despite the role that soy has played in boosting Argentina’s economic growth, 
particularly in the rural areas, the MML remains critical of the soy boom. The MML 
believes that the soy has a number of negative externalities, and worries about the effects 
of monocropping and pesticides on the soil and local community. The movement is also 
concerned about the link between soy production and their efforts to prevent the 
concentration of land in the hands of foreign corporations, as well as the effects of 
government policies which favor large exporters and foreign business entities over the 
well-being of small farmers.160 In the province of Santa Fe, the foreigners who sell soy 
goods for export “pay few taxes,” and Santa Fe also “exempts them from income 
taxes.”161 By providing foreigners with tax exemptions, the small and medium sized 
farmers are largely excluded from the benefits of the soy boom, as tax revenue from the 
soy goods is not redistributed throughout the community.  
 For the foreseeable future, the women are planning to continue their fight to 
preserve the lifestyle and land of the small farmers. Even though economic conditions 
have improved somewhat, even today the women believe that “there is an absence of 
institutional intermediaries and state politics,” meaning that small farmers are still 
vulnerable to fluctuations in international prices and trade flows.162 The women are 
planning to fight for a law which would limit the number of hectares that foreigners and 
multinational corporations can buy, and they also hope that one day, the number of small 
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farmers within Argentina will increase to one million.163 The MML will not cease its 
efforts until it establishes a political and economic environment which protects and 
defends the rights of small farmers. 
 
Conclusion 
 The MML plays a powerful role in Argentine politics, and many comparisons 
have been made between the MML and another important Argentine social movement, 
Las Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. Historically, the division of labor between men and 
women in the countryside has been quite strong, and women did not have a voice in 
agrarian organizations or other political or public spaces. However, neoliberal economic 
policies implemented by President Menem as Argentina prepared for integration into 
Mercosur and the resulting crisis among small farmers provided the women with a unique 
opportunity to immerse themselves into Argentine politics. The women saw the economic 
threat posed to the small farmers, and responded to the foreclosures by forming a 
movement which sought to protect their families and their lifestyle. 
 The MML is a decentralized movement, and it does not have a rigid, bureaucratic 
structure. Even though the lack of formal organization may make the MML appear weak, 
the movement’s decentralized structure provides the women with the space needed to 
operate efficiently and to attract women from around the countryside to their cause. The 
organization’s loose structure also provides the women with the space needed to discuss, 
change, or amend the movement’s goals in response to changing economic or political 
policies. Thus far, the women have achieved remarkable things through their presence at 
the foreclosures, marches, and through their use of a variety of media outlets. Also, 
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because the movement is not formally tied to an agrarian organization or a political party, 
the women have the sovereignty necessary to determine the movement’s direction and 
future.   
 The future of the MML should be extremely interesting. The women’s victory in 
the judicial system allowed them to successfully change the way in which the 
foreclosures were handled in the countryside, igniting hope that in the future, the 
Argentine government will take a closer look at the economic hardships faced by small, 
rural farmers stemming from its neoliberal economic policies. Although the trial was the 
first time that the movement had operated inside the judicial system, the trial was a 
successful mechanism that the women may consider utilizing again in the future. With 
the trial, the women had the opportunity to turn criminal allegations into a success when 
the judge decided to examine the foreclosures in which so many small farmers had lost 
their fields. Even though the economic situation is no longer as precarious as it once was, 
the legal system may provide a channel in which the women can continue their fight for 
justice for those who have lost their land and for those who are still in danger of losing it.  
 Although the examination of the foreclosure process and the beginning of the soy 
boom have temporarily alleviated the economic crisis in the countryside, the MML still 
has important issues to work on. Concerns about the sustainability of the soy boom and 
monocropping mean that Argentine farmers may soon again face a harsh economic 
reality, as monocropping and deforestation threaten the land’s future use. Even though it 
will be difficult to attract new members during a period of relative economic calm, the 
women must draw attention to the problematic agricultural practices, such as 
monocropping, and raise awareness about practices such as tax exemptions for foreign 
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companies and businessmen. Even though Argentina is undergoing a soy boom, the 
MML is ready and willing to continue their fight in these new areas. 
 Despite improvements in their economic situation, the MML still has work to do. 
The economy has improved; however, small farmers are not protected by government 
policies, and they remain vulnerable to fluctuations in the regional and international 
markets. A change in Argentina’s economic situation could place the small farmers in 
danger of foreclosures again, and many in the countryside still lack access to basic 
services such as schools. Small farmers believe that they are largely excluded from the 
economic benefits of regional trade, and the MML will not rest until the government 
enacts programs and policies which ensure the productive capabilities of small farmers 
and allow them to experience the benefits of regional economic integration. The 
movement did achieve an important milestone in 2003, when Argentina’s courts began an 
investigation into the debt crisis and foreclosure process. In the future, the MML will 
continue to act in ways which will further their fight for Argentina’s small farmers, 
because “although we may be more or less active, we will still be here.”164 
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Conclusion 
_______________________________ 
 
With the marked rise in the formation of regional organizations over the past two 
decades, it is important to examine the policies implemented in countries preparing for 
accession to these organizations. Oftentimes, countries may initiate significant changes in 
their economic and political policies in an effort to comply with membership 
requirements or expectations; however, these changes may have important social 
ramifications. Social movements formed in reaction to the policy changes implemented, 
although narrow in the sense that they are limited to certain segments or sectors of the 
population, have the potential to create deep social divisions. These deep divisions may 
undermine domestic support for the regional project, thereby placing its future in 
jeopardy. Consequently, it is important to examine the policy changes implemented, the 
social reaction formed by groups which perceive themselves to be excluded from the 
benefits of regionalism, and the government’s response to these social movements.  
 In the case of Mexico, NAFTA has a direct and causal relationship with the 
formation of the EZLN. The Zapatistas were formed by the peasants and indigenous 
population in Chiapas who perceived themselves to be excluded from the benefits of 
regional policies. Deep pre-existing economic and social divisions created a rift between 
Mexico’s elite and the majority of the population, which was living in poverty. The 
decision of Mexico’s political and economic leaders to join NAFTA, as well as the 
neoliberal economic policies and the revision of Article 27, was the trigger which ignited 
the underlying resentment of the participants in the Zapatista movement. The Zapatistas 
emerged as an armed reformist movement, and demanded a variety of political 
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concessions from Mexico’s government during peace negotiations. However, Mexico’s 
political leaders were unwilling to implement the political changes demanded by the 
Zapatistas, such as a revision of Article 27. Instead of implementing political changes 
which would have met the demands of the Zapatistas, the Salinas administration 
responded through economic measures. While the spending programs implemented were 
intended to establish a social safety net which would assuage the Zapatistas, these 
spending programs did not create significant change in the eyes of the EZLN. 
Consequently, the Zapatista movement has continued to protest Mexico’s decision to 
participate in NAFTA and has become a world-renowned symbol of the opposition to 
regional trade agreements.  
 While the Zapatista movement has a direct and causal link to the formation of 
NAFTA, the formation of the MML in Argentina has an indirect and general link to the 
policies implemented in preparation for integration into Mercosur. The majority of 
Argentina’s population is concentrated in the capital of Buenos Aires, the seat of the 
country’s political and economic power. The remaining minority of the population is 
spread throughout one of Argentina’s twenty-three provinces. While many Argentines 
living in the countryside often felt as though they were excluded from these centers of 
power, there was never as much underlying resentment as their was with the Zapatistas. 
However, the economic and political policies implemented during Menem’s presidency 
as Argentina prepared for accession into Mercosur led many small provincial farmers to 
believe that they were excluded from the benefits of regional integration. The 
unprecedented use of executive privilege through emergency decrees, the rise in 
foreclosures, and the farmers’ debt led to the spontaneous formation of the MML. 
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Formed by farmers’ spouses in protest of these policies, the women worked to establish 
government policies which would protect their future as small farmers and would ensure 
that the policies implemented were truly just. Unlike Mexico, the Argentine government 
did not increase spending in the provinces; rather, after 1995 provincial spending rates 
decreased drastically. However, the MML did achieve an important political victory in 
2003 when an Argentine judge began an investigation into the foreclosure process and 
debt crisis in the provinces. When an examination of the policies implemented led the 
judge to rule that the foreclosure process was unjust, the immediate crisis was resolved, 
and the social protests in the provinces declined as a result.  
 As regionalism looks to grow and expand, it is important that policymakers 
closely examine the political and economic policies implemented in preparation for their 
country’s accession into regional organizations, as well as the social reactions formed in 
response to these changes. The complexity of this task is highlighted by the examples of 
Mexico and Argentina, as a variety of factors such as neoliberal economic reforms, 
constitutional amendments, the use of executive privilege, and allegations of corruption 
led these groups to perceive that they were excluded from the benefits of regional 
economic integration. Changes in long-standing government policies and promises made 
in preparation for regional integration may lead to the formation of significant sources of 
social division, and these divisions may place the future of the regional project in 
jeopardy. In the case of Mexico, economic support programs were implemented in an 
attempt to assuage the demands of the EZLN; however, these measures failed to address 
the movement’s political concerns, and the Zapatistas continued to protest their country’s 
policies and involvement in NAFTA. In Argentina, however, a court case involving the 
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MML led the courts to an examination of the fairness and legitimacy of the policies and 
practices implemented. The presiding judge ruled that the foreclosure process and debt 
crisis faced by small farmers showed evidence of corruption, and the re-structuring of 
these policies and practices satisfied the immediate political demands made by the MML.  
Therefore, in order to promote both economic and social integration, economic 
spending programs may not be sufficient. Rather, the regional project must work to 
ensure that groups which perceive themselves to be excluded from the benefits of 
regional integration have a political voice. Oftentimes, groups such as the Zapatistas and 
the MML inhabit areas which are geographically segregated from their countries’ centers 
of economic and political power. While organizations such as Mercosur began to 
establish regional outposts in order to incorporate citizens’ voices in the organization’s 
policies, at the national level countries must ensure that the well-being and wishes of 
their citizens are incorporated in the policy changes implemented in preparation for 
accession into such organizations. Failure to provide citizens with a political voice in the 
process will perpetuate the formation of groups which perceive themselves to be 
excluded from the benefits of legitimacy. Incorporating the voices of the citizens in the 
process of regional integration will help ensure that the policy changes implemented are 
fair, legitimate, and in the best interest of the country as a whole. Enhancing citizen voice 
at the national level will create an inclusive environment and prevent the deep social 
divisions which threaten the future of the regional project. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
_______________________________ 
 
¿Por qué forman este grupo de mujeres? ¿Quién son las fundadores?  ¿Por cuestiones 
económicos, las políticas/ el gobierno o algo en la sociedad? 
 
¿Qué tipo de mujeres participan en el MML? Como su edad, tipo de trabajo, educación, 
situación económica o político, tienen hijos y esposos o no. 
 
¿Pienses que este es un cambio en la participación política para las mujeres del campo? 
 
¿Cómo forman el conocimiento político y económico de estas mujeres? 
 
¿Qué fueron las acciones de las pioneras y las fundadores del grupo para atraer atención y 
mejorar el conocimiento de su situación económico y político? 
 
¿Por qué decidieron a trabajar afuera de la Federación Agraria de la Argentina? 
 
El MML es una organización autónoma. ¿Qué significa autónoma para ustedes? 
 
¿En el pasado había conexiones entre el MML y partidos políticos? Si sí, ¿que tipo de 
conexiones y existen estos conexiones hoy en día? 
 
¿Apoyan a candidatos específicos en las elecciones presidenciales? ¿Qué es la posición 
del MML durante las elecciones presidenciales/ provinciales /locales?  
 
¿Qué cambios piden del gobierno? ¿Qué es que el MML quiere lograr? 
 
¿Qué métodos usan en el pasado para lograr cambios? ¿Y hoy? Si había un cambio, ¿Por 
qué?  
 
¿Qué tipo de relaciones tiene el MML con el gobierno (ejemplo: los oficiales, diputados) 
en el pasado? ¿Hoy? 
 
¿Cómo organizan la red del MML? ¿Quién son las liderazgos y como eligen a ellas? 
 
¿Qué es la visión del MML para su futuro? ¿Es una forma de participación político que 
pueden sustentar en el futuro?  ¿Creen que el MML podrían lograr los cambios que 
piden? 
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Appendix B: MML Petition  
_______________________________ 
 
¡ ¡ ¡ Solidaridad con el Movimiento de Mujeres en Lucha ! ! ! 
Las dirigentes del Movimiento de Mujeres en Lucha Ana Galmarini, Ana 
Maria Riveiro, Ema Martín y Sara Coll han sido procesadas y son llevadas a 
juicio en el Juzgado Correccional Nùmero 2 de Mercedes, Provincia de 
Buenos Aires,  por el hecho de entonar el Himno Nacional oponiéndose de 
manera pacífica al remate del campo del Sr Vasallo, pequeño productor 
agrario de la localidad de Chivilcoy (provincia de Buenos Aires) quién 
también resultó procesado junto a su familia.  
Las militantes del Movimiento de Mujeres en Lucha (MML)son reconocidas 
nacional e internacionalmente por su lucha contra los remates por deudas 
usurarias ordenados por bancos y otras entidades financieras que han 
afectado y afectan las  propiedades de miles de pequeños y medianos 
productores ahogados por la política liberal de la década del 90 y la falta de 
rentabilidad.  
Hoy, cuando crece con fuerza el repudio y la condena a las violaciones de 
los derechos humanos implementada por la Dictadura Genocida a los 
luchadores sociales y políticos, es necesario impedir la criminilización del 
accionar del Movimiento de Mujeres en Lucha, tal como pretende la Fiscalía 
al acusarlas de la supuesta violación de los artículos 237 y 239 del Código 
Penal por resistencia y atentado a la autoridad al cantar el himno nacional 
ante la realización del remate.  
Las personas y organizaciones abajo firmantes declaramos nuestra plena 
solidaridad y apoyo a la Justa Lucha del Movimiento de Mujeres en Lucha y 
exigimos el inmediato sobreseimiento y cierre de la causa contra Ana 
Galmarini, Ana Maria Riveiro, Ema Martín y Sara Coll.  
 
Apellido y Nombres Número de 
Documento 
Firma 
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